

Israel's 'Good Fence' Policy

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The formation of Likud government headed by Menachem Begin in 1977 led to important changes in Israel's Lebanon policy. Likud's foreign policy was activities, supportive of frequent and extensive use of force as an instrument for dealing with Israel's political and military problems. The change over, therefore, brought with it a very assertive posture vis-à-vis Lebanon than hitherto pursued by the government of Yitzhak Rabin.

Begin openly acknowledge Israel's role in Lebanon both in the South and in Beirut. He publicly sympathized with the Christians and declared that Israel was duty bound to protect them. The Lebanese Front which was in an exultant and defiant mood because of the military outcome of the Civil War, became very bold and assertive following the installation of the Likud government. It redetected all peace plans put forward by Syria and declared that the future of Lebanon could be determined only after the expulsion of Palestinians from the country and the withdrawal of Syrian peace-keeping troops. The intransigent attitude of Lebanese Front led to a break with Syria which once again began to support the NM and the PRM. The War by proxy in the South also intensified after the formation of Begin's government.

Civil War

An important facet to the Israeli policy during the Civil War was its covert links with the Christian residents of Southern Lebanon. The village of Kleia in the eastern sector of the Lebanese-Israeli border with a population of about 6,000 mainly maronites was the first to initiate contacts with Israel

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towards the end of 1975. when the Lebanese army disintegrated in March 1976, most of the army units in the South joined the anti-establishment LAA, the inhabitants of Kleia, however, refused to declare allegiance to the LAA and appealed to Israel for assistance. Israel responded by extending humanitarian as well as military aid. It offered to house the displaced residents of Kleia in temporary camps inside Israel, provided them with medical assistance and even permitted them to work in the Upper Galilee region. The IDF, meanwhile, set about putting in place a small Lebanese Christian militia for the defence of the Christian villages in the South which were willing to cooperate with Israel.

During the spring and summer of 1976, as cooperation between the residents of Kleia and Israel intensified, the latter sought to extend its influence to other Christian villages in the South. The village of Rmeish in the central sector and Alma as – Shaab in the western sector soon became the recipients of direct Israeli assistance, both humanitarian as well as military. The IDF soon created a South Lebanon Command or ADAL (in Hebrew: Ezer Drom Levanon) headed by Colonel Benyamin Ben – Eliezer with its headquarters in Metualla to look after Israel's ties with the Christians of the South¹.

The humanitarian aspect of the cooperation between Lebanese Christians of the South and Israel was made public in June 1976 when Israel officially inaugurated its 'Good Fence' policy. Under it field clinics were set up for the Lebanese along the frontier at Metualla, Dovev and Hanita. Over a period of one year, nearly 30,000 Lebanese received medical aid at these clinics. Serious cases which could not be attended to there were invariably sent to Israeli hospitals for treatment. Israel also began to provide Lebanese border villages with water, food and fuel, and Israeli agricultural officers offered free counseling to the South Lebanese farmers. Lebanese were also taken on conducted study tours of Israeli farms. Israeli merchants purchased 30 tonnes of Lebanese tobacco valued at \$447,000 and a large number of Lebanese commuted daily to Israel for work. Lebanese residents were allowed to visit relations in Israel and Israeli Maronites were allowed to visit their relatives in Southern Lebanon. A bi-weekly bus service was also started and a mobile postal unit accepted mail for dispatch via the Israeli postal system².

Needless to say that there were a variety of motives behind this Israeli

programme of providing humanitarian aid to the residents of South Lebanon. First, Israel hoped to create conditions that would make it impossible for Palestinian guerillas to return and resume operations in Southern Lebanon. Second, Israel wished to consolidate its influence among the population of the South, and especially among the Christians. Third, this policy also represented the cultivation of proxies to promote Israeli objectives in the South and for the expansion of Israeli influence as far north in Lebanon as possible. Finally, the 'Good Fence' assured a steady and detailed flow of information about the Palestinians and the course of the war to Israeli intelligence³.

Appointment of Major Saad Georges Haddad

The fledgling Christian militia that Israel had clandestinely set up in the South Required a leader who could command the respect of his men and give it a sense of purpose and direction. For this, Israel turned to Saad Haddad, a Major in the Lebanese Army. Haddad was considered ideal for the job due to a variety of reasons. Born of Roman Catholic father and Maronite mother in the southern town of Marjayoun, Haddad had received his commission in the Lebanese Army as a second lieutenant in 1960. He had become a major in 1974 and was widely admired by the Christians of the South. Haddad was well known for his anti-Palestinian and chauvinist Christian views. At the start of the Civil War in 1975, Haddad was serving in Marjayoun as the second-in-command to the sector commander, the commanding officer of the eastern sector. When the Lebanese army disintegrated in March 1976 Haddad moved north to Beirut and joined the Christian controlled Trabulsi barracks.

In October 1976, Haddad was approached by Lieutenant Adnan Homsî, a native of the South who was working for Israel with the offer to head the Israeli controlled Christian militia in the South. Haddad accepted the offer and in November went to Aqua Marina, the Christian controlled port in Jounieh, from whence he was transported by an Israeli patrol boat to Haifa.⁴ after a two months stay in Israel, during which time he was introduced to high ranking officers of the IDF, Haddad was finally appointed officer-in-charge of the three Christian enclaves around Kleia, Rmeish and Alma-as-Shab in the eastern, central and western sector.

Soon after the appointment of Haddad, there was a rapid expansion in the size of the enclaves, as one by one neighbouring Shiite villages were

systematically brought under Israeli subjugation. Dir Mimas, Tel Lubia, Kila and the village of Adeisse adjoining the eastern enclave were captured in quick succession by Haddad's militia⁵. El Khiam with a population of twelve thousand was now the only place left in the area that had not been taken over by Haddad's militia. From a purely geographical point of view the town's inclusion in the enclave was of utmost importance. The Shiite population of the town which was sympathetic to the Palestinian and LAA forces stationed there, denounced the links between the enclaves and Israel. Preparations for the capture of EI Khiam stated in late January and on the 19th February 1977, Haddad's militia equipped with Israeli armour and backed by Israeli artillery moved against the town. Outnumbered and outgunned, the LAA-PLO force defending the town surrendered after tough battle⁶.

Military Setbacks

The Christian enclaves which had been established in the central sector of the Lebanese-Israeli border consist of four villages, Rmeish which was the largest followed by Ein Ibel, Dibel and Kosah. A few Shiite and mixed Shiite-Christian villages lay between them which cooperated off and on with the Israelis. To the west and just on the other side of the Israeli border lay the villages of Alma as-Shaab around which had developed the western enclave.

In contrast to the situation in the eastern enclave defence in the central and western enclaves was relatively lax as there were very few professional soldiers. Until the arrival of Haddad, the lack of a recognized leadership had made it impossible to organize a defensive system among the villages or to develop an overall local strategic attitude, either militarily or politically. With the appointment of Haddad as the overall leader of the three zones, things began to change.

Haddad helped the Israelis in organizing the defences of the central western enclaves and in the setting up of a unified militia for all the three sectors. Aggressive armoured patrols were sent from these enclaves to the neighbouring villages like Naqoura, Deheira, Yarin and Yaroun. The patrols led to frequent skirmishes between Haddad's militia and the Lebanese and Palestinian fighters. The skirmishes reached a climax in August 1977 when a patrol under George Farah, the local commanding officer in the western enclave attacked Yarin. The PLO and their allies has a strong

presence in Yarin and during the past few weeks had blocked the South Lebanon highway preventing the flow of traffic between the central and western enclave. During the exchange of fire a number of volunteers from Somalia who had joined the PLO were killed. Farah was unable to storm the PLO stronghold and had to retreat. He mounted another attack on Yarin a few days later but his force came under heavy fire from a detachment of Somalis. Farah was bit in the head and died shortly afterwards. The attackers retreated to Alam as Shaab, which was by then itself being heavily shelled.⁷

The military situation in the enclaves had also deteriorated during the past few months. In April the LAA, PLO forces attacked Taibe which had been taken over by Haddad's militia and drove out the Christian forces from the town.⁸ Haddad's militia launched a counter-attack shortly thereafter but his men ran into an exceptionally strong defence of Taibe by the LAA-PLO troops and Haddad himself narrowly escaped death. When news of this setback reached the IDF, General Eitan himself arrived at the 'Good Fence' worried about Haddad's fate and decided to send him to an Israeli hospital for rest and recuperation.⁹ The defeat at Taibe was followed by yet another setback when on 7 April LAA-PLO forces stormed and retook El-Khiam. The fall of El-Khiam prompted the Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon to publicly warn that Israel "shall not tolerate activity against Lebanese villages that are so close the border" and that such activity in all likelihood could lead to a general West Asian war.¹⁰ Syria which was discreetly aiding the LAA-PLO offensive in the South realized that any further military action might lead to direct Israeli intervention. Together with Sarkis, Syria, therefore, exercised a restraining influence on the PLO and a ceasefire was worked out which brought a period of temporary calm in the border region.¹¹

The fall of Taibe and El-Khaim badly affected the morale of the Christians in the three enclaves. In order to deal with the issue of morale, the IDF called to special duty Captain Yoram Hamizrachi, an Israeli TV correspondent in northern Israel who had been involved on a voluntary basis in the activities of the ADAL. Captain Hamizrachi along with other IDF personnel started by spending most of their time with the Lebanese inside the enclaves. Another proposal aimed at boosting morale put forward by ADAL was the building of a radio station for Haddad's forces. Colonel Ben-Elezier suggested that the IDF transfer to Haddad a mobile radio

transmitter which had been acquired by Israel in the early seventies for its Kurdish allies in Iraq. The IDF, however turned down the proposal because of opposition from the Lebanese Front in the north who feared that it would give Haddad too much political propaganda power. A third Israeli initiative for improving morale in the Christian enclaves was the establishment of military courses for young Lebanese women and girls. These courses were conducted clandestinely in military camps in northern Israel and after training the girls joined active duty in defence of the Christian held areas.¹²

On 8 April 1977 Haddad's existence was publicly revealed when for the first time he was introduced by Israel to a select band of journalists, near the 'Good Fence' near the Metulla. Haddad who had a strong media presence immediately became a favourite of the Israeli press. In the weeks to come daily reports in the Israeli press and TV created in the minds of the average Israeli citizen a deep sense of solidarity and sympathy for the Christians of the South.

Haddad, however, found it difficult to expand his domain beyond the here Christian border enclave as the Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies were being supported by the Syrian army. The pressure in Israel to relieve the Christians increased and this ultimately resulted in the March 1978 invasion of Lebanon.

Israel's March 1978 Invasion

On 11 March 1978, a group of Palestinian commandos from Damour landed on the Israeli coast, thirty kilometers south of Haifa. They hijacked a bus full of weekend travelers on the nearby Tel Aviv-Haifa highway and drove it to the suburbs of Tel Aviv where in the ensuing battle with Israeli security forces thirty four Israelis were killed and seventy four wounded.¹³ the incident of 11 March sent a wave of outrage throughout Israel. A massive Israeli response was inevitable. Although the entire world recognized the inevitability of a super-relation against Lebanon, the scope and intensity of the Israeli operation which commenced three days later took everyone by surprise.

Just before dawn on 14 March, Israeli artillery opened up on Lebanese villages held by the Palestinians and leftists. The shelling was followed by a ground attack with approximately 20,000 Israeli soldiers advancing of

five axes¹⁴. The Israeli forces consisted mainly of regular infantry and paratrooper units. Command of the operation, code-named 'Even Hachochma' (stone of Wisdom), was given to the infantry. The IDF did not encounter any significant resistance except in two places, Bint Jubayl and Taibe, where the Palestinians briefly engaged the advancing Israeli troops.¹⁵ The overwhelming majority of the commandos simply evacuated their positions and fled to safer zones in the north. The objective of their invasion was to wipe out all commando concentrations along the entire length of the Israeli-Lebanese border and to destroy all their special bases from which the commandos set out on missions deep inside Israeli territory.¹⁶ By the end of the first day Israel had secured what Haddad's militia had failed to provide all-along a buffer zone ranging in depth from five to twenty kilometers, stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the foothills of Mount Hermon. Between 16 and 18 March, the IDF continued to make small advances in those areas where the security belt was thinner than ten kilometers.¹⁷ Concerned about casualties, the IDF abandoned its traditional practice of high mobility. Choosing instead to advance its infantry very cautiously behind a devastating wall of artillery fire. Although this technique minimized Israeli casualties, it led to large-scale civilian deaths and destruction.¹⁸ As the Israeli forces moved north, Haddad's militia followed in their wake, looting the Shiite villages which successfully held out for so long.¹⁹

On 19 March, just when it seemed that the operation was coming to an end, the IDF suddenly broke out of the buffer zone towards the Litani river, and by evening, Israel controlled the entire area from its border to the Litani river except for the town of Tyre.²⁰ According to one Israeli source, the new advance "was designed to carve out a PLO-Free security belt in the 1200 square kilometers between Israel's northern border and the Litani river."²¹ In reality, however, it was international politics that had played the crucial role in the decision to expand the operation.

On 15 March, the Lebanese government had lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council and the following day the US had given a call for an immediate Israeli withdrawal. On the same day the US proposed before the UN that the Israeli forces at present in Lebanon be immediately replaced by a UN force.²² When the US resolutely pushed for a UN Security Council resolution calling for an Israeli withdrawal and the dispatch of UN troops to South Lebanon, the Israeli government was taken by surprise.

The Israeli thrust towards the Litani was, therefore, seen by many as an attempt to achieve the maximum possible before the vote on the proposed UN Security Council resolution. This would increase the area the Israeli government could trade with the UN and leave manoeuvring room to fall back on all the way to its recently created security belt.²³

Given the size and intensity of the Israeli operation it is obvious that Tel Aviv's decision to invade Lebanon was not a spontaneous reaction to a particularly gruesome incident of Palestinian terrorism but had been made much before the incident of 11 March. The Palestinian action only provided the Begin government with a strong public-relations basis upon which an already decided military operation could be launched. Secondly, the declared Israeli objective of the invasion that of 'liquidating' the PLO as resolved at a special session of the Knesset does not make much sense when one analyses the military aspects of the operation. The three-day gap between the Palestinian raid and the invasion gave the PLO sufficient time to move its forces to safer zones in the north. Even the pattern of attack—from south northwards gave the PLO ample scope to escape. "A liquidation strategy would have called for surprise seizure of the Litani by amphibian and helicopter-borne troops to cut off the PLO forces' lines of retreat."²⁴ The IDF also abandoned its traditional strategy of high mobility, preferring instead to advance its mechanized infantry very cautiously behind a devastating wall of artillery fire. Although this technique minimized Israeli casualties, it maximized noncombatant deaths and civil destruction and permitted the great bulk of enemy commandos to cross the Litani river to relative safety. "The Israeli army, once renowned for its Davidian finesse, was used as a huge, stomping Goliath, hitting with all its might at places from which the terrorists had already fled."²⁵ Finally, the IDF's treatment of Tyre also was at variance with the declared Israeli objective of liquidating the PLO. The largest concentration of Palestinians in the South was in Tyre where the PLO had three refugee camps. Yet the IDF completely bypassed PLO concentrations around Tyre, thereby, creating an enclave which came to be known as the 'Tyre Pocket'.

In the light of the preceding analysis, it can be said that the Israeli objectives in invading Lebanon were very different. These were basically two. The first was the establishment of a security belt which was merely a euphemism for annexation. For months, Israel had been trying through its proxy Saad Haddad to set up a security belt by territorially linking the three Christian

enclaves but Haddad's militia had repeatedly failed in this regard. The Begin government seems to have come to the conclusion that a direct Israeli military intervention was required in order to achieve this objective and the incident of 11 March came as a handy excuse to launch an already decided upon military operation. A second objective of the invasion was to disrupt the Shtura Accords of July 1977 and thereby, the entire fabric of Syrian – PLO – Sarkis consensus on the interpretation as well as implementation of the Cairo Accords of 1969. Given the centrality of the Shtura Accords to future national reconciliation and the rebuilding of a national army as well as its crucial role in the whole gamut of Lebanese-Syrian-PLO relations", the Israeli objective can only have been to throw everything into turmoil once again.²⁶ There is ample evidence of this, even prior to the invasion. The war by proxy in the South in the second half of 1977 was an attempt to obstruct the implementation of the Shtura Accords. The deliberate havoc wrought on the civilian population of South Lebanon during the invasion was specifically intended to create chaotic conditions in Lebanon once again. It is self-evident that the combined use of an incredibly intensive air, land and sea fire-power against densely populated towns and villages can have only one effect: 'a pandemonium of panic and a mass stampede of civilians, not to mention a wanton loss of innocent lives'.²⁷ Nearly 2000 Lebanese civilians were killed during the invasion and an equal number wounded. The invasion also created severe refugee problems which the Lebanese government was ill-prepared to cope. More than 250000 fled to the north in order to escape the wrath of the Israeli army. There was hardly a town or village south of the Litani that was not affected by the invasion. In over 100 Shiite villages nearly 2500 houses were completely destroyed and twice that number severely damaged.²⁸ HDS greenway, Washington Post correspondent reported.

From the slopes of Mount Hermon in the east to the heights overlooking Tyre in the west, the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon has left a broad patch of death and destruction unprecedented in the region south of the Litani River. Nothing that has gone before... Prepares one for the devastation that has been visited on the ancient stone towns in this rolling, rock-strewn farming country.²⁹

Yet to recover from the rigours of the Civil War, the Israeli invasion sent fresh shock waves reverberating through the Lebanese body politic and

doomed all prospects of an early national reconciliation. As a result of the invasion, tensions between Syria and the Lebanese Front became more manifest. Hawks within the Lebanese Front considered the moment opportune for a large-scale Maronite offensive aimed at driving out the Syrians and Palestinians from Lebanese soil. Soon enough these tensions were translated into armed clashes in the suburbs of Beirut between militias of the NM and the Lebanese Front. Three days (9-12 April) of intense fighting left thirty-three dead and scores wounded and led to the resignation of Premier Salim al-Hoss.³⁰ The country once again teetered on the brink of a Civil War. A nationwide conflict was narrowly averted when on the personal intervention of President Sarkis, a ceasefire was worked out and Saudi and Sudanese units of the ADF deployed along the lines separating East and West Beirut.

Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

On 19 March 1978, hours after the IDF had begun to move towards the Litani, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 425. The two key points of the resolution which was sponsored by the US, were (i) a call upon Israel to immediately “cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory”, and (ii) the establishment of a United Nations Interim Force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of “confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.”³¹

Despite its vehement opposition to US-sponsored Resolution 425, Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire two days later. The Israeli Defence Minister Ezer Weizmann met with general Ensio Siilasvuo, Commander of United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) and Major General Emmanuel S. Erskin, Commander of the newly appointed UNIFIL. At this meeting following three points were agreed upon between Israel and the UN officer.

1. The area overrun by the IDF in the second stage of the invasion would become a buffer zone;
2. UNIFIL would be responsible for patrolling the buffer zone; and

3. The strip of territory lying between the Israeli-Lebanese boundary and the UNIFIL buffer zone would be designated a “peace zone” to be patrolled by the militia of Major Haddad and units of the Lebanese army. Israel would be permitted to continue its ‘Good Fence Program; with the Lebanese inhabitants of the border region.³²

Consequently, instead of being pressured into turning over its ten-kilometer ‘security belt’ to UNIFIL, Israel simply bargained away its additional conquests, thereby buying time in which to solidify Haddad’s grip on the strip of Lebanese territory.

The first contingent of UNIFIL consisting of elements of the Swedish infantry battalion entered Lebanon by way of Israel on 22 March 1978. In the months of April through June, an international force began to take up positions south of the Litani.³³ The Israeli withdrawal called for by Resolution 425, took place very slowly and in several stages beginning on 11 April. By 30 April, Israel had turned over to UNIFIL around 550 square kilometers of Lebanese territory and was left in control of the security belt seized during the first phase of the invasion.³⁴ With regard to the security belt itself, Israel dragged its feet. Under strong international pressure, it finally set a firm date for its withdrawal from Lebanon – 13 June 1978. The withdrawal, according to the Israeli Cabinet Secretary, Ayre Naor, would be unconditional, but Israel would be obliged to “take measures to ensure the security of the local Christian Lebanese population.”³⁵

On 13 June, as promised the IDF formally ended its ninety-one day occupation of Southern Lebanon. In a military ceremony at Meis al-Jabal the Israeli flag was lowered. However, the security belt occupied by the IDF was handed over not to the UNIFIL but to Haddad and his militia. Speaking on the occasion General Yanosh said “The Israeli government insists on its commitment to continue to protect the Christian minority in South Lebanon”.³⁶ It was clear that Israel had no intention of relinquishing its hold over the security strip and even though the IDF had withdrawn, Haddad’s militia had now been charged with the responsibility of policing the area on behalf of Israel. During the weeks preceding the withdrawal, the IDF had resupplied and reinforced the militia which now had a strength of three thousand and its ability to hold on not just to the three former enclaves but entire security strip was greatly enhanced.

Soon after the IDF withdrawal, the Lebanese government decided to dispatch an army contingent to the South to establish a symbol of authority as well as supplement the UNIFIL effort in policing the area. With characteristic caution Sarkis at first dispatched several Lebanese officers to meet their Israeli counterparts at the UNIFIL Headquarters at Naqurah to discuss the impending southern movement of the army. During the meeting, Israel placed four pre-conditions for the deployment of the Lebanese army in the South: (1) the position of Major Haddad must be officially recognized by the Lebanese government, (2) units of the Lebanese army could be deployed only outside the security trip, (3) no Syrian officers or advisors could accompany the army and (4) no interference with the 'Good Fence' would be tolerated.³⁷

The nature of the demand made it clear that Israel would accept no Lebanese military deployment in the South except under conditions that would make the Sarkis regime an active accomplice in the Israeli plan to annex the border region. The second and fourth points were clearly aimed at luring Sarkis into an arrangement whereby the Christian enclaves would be Lebanese in name only.

On 31 July 1978, the Lebanese President dispatched a 650 man army battalion to the South. The unit planned to establish its headquarters in Tibnin, a village north of Bint Jubayl and outside the security belt. The Lebanese soldiers received enthusiastic reception in the villages on their way as they proceeded south. The cheering stopped at Kawkaba, however, as the battalion came under an artillery attack by Haddad's militia.³⁸ By entering Kawkaba, the Lebanese unit indicated its intention of moving to Tibnin by way of the Christian enclave in the vicinity of Marjayoun, a violation of the second point of the Israeli guidelines. The lightly-armed Lebanese battalion was in no position to challenge the Israeli-backed Haddad militia. Under the circumstances the Lebanese Defence Ministry was left with no option but to order the expeditionary force back to its barracks.

In early 1979, the Lebanese government made yet another serious effort to assert its authority in the South and restore the state's sovereignty in the border area. Serious preparation began in 1979 to send an army unit to the South and the Lebanese government negotiated with the PLO and the NM for the unhindered passage of the troops along the coast. The battalion

began its southward sojourn on 17 April and the following day was deployed in the central sector of the UNIFIL-held area. The newly arrived battalion was immediately subjected to intense shelling by Haddad's militia and the UNIFIL itself was subjected to one of the most violent attacks ever by Haddad's troops. Haddad then followed this up by proclaiming the independence of the border strip under his control and named it the "Free State of Lebanon".³⁹

Haddad's 'State', an area ten kilometers deep and extending ninety kilometers along the border contained some 60,000 Shiites and 40,000 Maronites, most of the latter having being transferred from the north via Israel. In September, with Israeli assistance, a radio station called "The voice of Hope" began to operate and in November Haddad issued instructions for the collection of taxes in the area under his control. Food and civil supplies came from Israel via the 'Good Fence' and residents of the enclave were employed in large numbers in Israeli farms and industrial establishments in the Galilee. Military aid came from Israel which also undertook to pay the salaries of the men serving in Haddad's militia.⁴⁰

By supporting and directing Haddad's defiance of the Lebanese government, it was obvious that Israel was thinking about issues much broader than the question of merely retaining its hold over the strip of Lebanese territory on the border. Israeli encouragement of Haddad was part of a wider strategy aimed at influencing the future shape of the Lebanese body politics itself. Specifically, the Israel-Haddad connection was an integral part of Israel's growing relationship with the Lebanese Front – particularly with its young and charismatic leader Bashir Jumayil.

Notes and References

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3. Cooley, n.28, p.46.
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5. *Ibid.*, pp. 184-87.
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12. Hamizrachi, n.59, pp. 135-37.
13. David Gilmour, *The Fractured Country* (London, 1983), p.148.
14. *Arab Report and Record*, 1-15 March 1978, no.5, p.148.
15. Hirsh Goodman, "Israeli Forces Holding Southern Lebanon", *Jerusalem Post* (International Edition) 21 March 1978, p.7.
16. See the text of the special communiqué issued by Israel on the eve of the invasion. *Arab World Weekly* (Beirut), 18 March 1978, no.465, p.23.
17. *Arab Report and Record*, 16-31 March 1978, no.6, pp.222-23.
18. Only eighteen IDF personnel lost their lives during the operation. *Newsweek*, 3 April 1978, p.39.
19. *Arab Report and Record*, 16-31 March 1978, p.200.
20. It was at this stage that the name of the invasion was changed from "Stone of Wisdom" to "Operation Litani".
21. Anan Safadi, *Jerusalem Post Magazine*, 7 April 1978, p.4.
22. There were several reasons for the extremely negative American reaction to the Israeli invasion. The US was concerned about the Egyptian-Israeli peace process which had begun only a few months back and which still second vulnerable to negative regional developments. If America did not react strongly to the full scale Israeli invasion, Sadat's position in the Arab world would have been greatly weakened and the whole peace process was liable to crumble. Secondly, the US was also interested in the expanding its influence in Syria in order to bring it into the orbit of the peace negotiations. The Israeli invasion seemed to adversely affect American prospects on his issue as well.
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24. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-26.
25. *Newsweek*, 3 April 1978, p.42.
26. Khalidi, no.48, p.126.
27. *Ibid.*, p.128.

28. *Ibid.*
29. Washington Post, 25 March 1978, cited in Samih Farsoun, "South Lebanon: The Israeli invasion" in Elaine C Hogopian and Samth Farsoun eds., *South Lebanon* (Detroit, 1978), p.36.
30. *Arab World Weekly*, 15 April 1978, no.469, pp.3-5.
31. For the complete text of Resolution 425, see *Arab Report and Record*, 16-31 March 1978, no.6, p.221.
32. *Ibid.*, p.225.
33. The Secretary-General's term of reference at first provided for a force of 4,000; these troops were founded as a result of a series of approaches made by him to the likely contributing countries. The result of his efforts was that nine countries in due course agreed to take part: Fiji, France, Iran, Ireland, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway and Senegal provided infantry battalions and Canada, France and Norway provided logistic units. The Security Council, on 3 May approved Waldheim's proposal to increase the size of UNIFIL by fifty percent to 6000 troops. The majority of the additional men came from Fiji, Iran and Ireland. For details see UN Department of public information, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peacekeeping* (New York, 1985), Chapter VI.
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35. *Ibid.*, 16-31 May 1978, no. p.389.
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