

Role of Army in the Third World Countries: A Case Study of Pakistan

Sukhwant S. Bindra*

It is extremely difficult to measure the range of politicization of army in a particular country. In the case of developed nations, the military is an integrated part of the political system, with the norms and traditions exercised firmly and with the effective help of political institutions that have been timely tested and had proved their effectiveness and legitimacy under conditions of mass political participation or controlled mass mobilization. On the contrary in the developing countries, the political and civilian institutions are not standing on sound footings. Though developing countries share many similarities but there is no uniform pattern of military intervention in these countries¹.

Military power is an essential condition for the survival of the state in war and also in peace time to enable it to pursue policies of effective deterrence and to endow the state with the capabilities necessary for making an effective ally. Comparisons of military organization are confusing since one must bear in mind at least three separate military elements: the strategic deterrent, the so called conventional weapons, traditionally divided into air, naval and army branches, and the strategic doctrine. Moreover, the respective importance of the three is constantly changing²

Who rules who has been a challenging political question since man developed his earliest forms of societal organization. Every political philosopher since the times of Plato has given his own version of who are the rulers and who should be the masses. Aristotle classified political organizations by indicating the manner in which they were ruled - a kind of numerical count of rule by one (dictatorship), a few (autocracy), or

*Head, Department of Political Science, Gurunanak Dev University, Amritsar-143005, India. Email: bindrasukhwant@yahoo.com

man(democracy)³

The importances of political institutions like the interest groups in democratic and authoritarian systems have been well recognized by the scholars in national and international politics. The political institutions are the context within which the choices of political elites are generally made. The scholars are reluctant to attribute too much influence to institutional arrangements because the realities of political culture are often quite different.

While there may be tens of thousands of interest groups, only a comparatively small number are vigorous and single minded enough to organize for political purposes⁴. When this happens, the groups undergo a transformation and become a pressure group. It is mere a body of individuals bent upon seeking a common interest. A pressure group is a body of individuals which is voluntarily organized to influence governmental policy without officially entering election contests.

The military is considered to be a general purpose interest group in many countries, either as a single group or somewhat divided into several services. As the military is to perform its duties in altogether different circumstances as compared to the bureaucracy, generally, the former emphasizes on more defense spending and the acquisition of nuclear armaments, a more authoritarian posture in domestic politics and a more vigorous pressing of national, territorial or ethnic claims against various neighbours⁵. Bruce Russett and Elizabeth Hanson in a careful survey of over 1000 high level American business executives and military officers in March-April 1973, concluded that the most hawkish interest groups were the military officers, the members of the National Committee of the Republican Party, and the businessmen, in that order, all the three were consistently more hawkish than a general sample of voters⁶.

There is a need to examine the role of general purpose interest group like the military in a relatively democratic and authoritarian system which ultimately leads to its politicization. In an authoritarian system, the policy making apparatus is generally centrally controlled and directed and thus in many ways it is relatively imperative to pressure. Nevertheless, the policy makers are sometimes forced to the outside sources for certain kind of specialized information, a certain degree of expertise, and some cooperation in the implementation of decisions. Because often there are groups (for “groupings”) that possess, these special characteristics, they usually

become associated with the top brass and whenever they get an opportunity, they exercise their influence. Though it is somewhat difficult to gauge the influence, but the degree of influence will be proportional to the policy maker's dependence for information and advice as such, on outside sources, the need for their expertise in handling various matters, and the extent to which their cooperation is necessary for the effective implementation of the decisions. Because policy makers in all systems sometimes have such needs, in all systems policy makers are sometimes influenced by interest groups. Definitely, there are differences from system to system but basically there are divergences in degree, not kind⁷. There is another aspect of the activities of the military to be considered with respect to authoritarian systems, namely, the fact that various groups often strive to protect their particular interest by forcibly or otherwise taking control of the policy making apparatus. In such an atmosphere, the objective is not to influence certain specific policies but rather to attain decisive influence within the policy making organs themselves.

With respect to more democratic systems it is necessary to distinguish between those in which policy making is relatively centralized and those in which it is not. India provides us with an example of heavy concentration of power in the hands of the ruling party. With its parliamentary system and fusion of powers, policies are framed and made by the ruling political party rather than via any kind of inter-party bargaining and compromise. In this kind of a situation there is a precious little room for interest groups like the military's influence external to the party structure. A wide variety of groups do seek to influence policy makers at both the executive and parliamentary level, but they do so primarily by working through and in connection with the parties themselves, middlemen and the bureaucrats. In some democratic systems like Sri Lanka, the decision making is much more diffused. Because of the system of separate institutions, with an intermingling checking, and balancing of functions and powers, decentralized political parties and a variety of other structural features, the policy making is difficult. But there are a multitude of points at which one may gain access to the policy making process. The interest groups investigate these constantly, trying their best to impress the key policy-makers. As most of the nations of this region, particularly India and Pakistan are spending millions on defence, a number of agencies desire to influence the policy making process. More and more groups are becoming involved

not only because of the size of the pie but also as a result of the two other factors (1) the distinction between foreign and domestic policy is becoming increasingly obscure, and (2) more and more sectors of economy are being geared specifically to defence and to related activities⁸.

It has been universally acknowledged that, the military is a part of a country's political set up, and tends to play an important role. Over the years, with fast changes that are taking place in the political, social, and economic and other related fields, the armed forces' active participation has been legitimised and is a part of the political culture at present. The military is bound to take interest in politics. It is not a new phenomenon. If we scan the pages of history, the instances of the military taking interest in the political affairs were available. Before 1917, nearly 40 percent of the states in existence witnessed the emergence of military power⁹. There is no change in this trend, and the military whenever circumstances allowed, has dethroned the popular governments. The military groups are more frequent in the developing countries as compared to the developed¹⁰
Samuel P. Huntington,

The Common Defence: Strategic Programmes in National Politics (New York)

A number of scholars like Samuel P.Huntington, S.E.Finer¹¹ Morris Janowitz¹² Fred R. Von Der Mehden¹³, A.R. Luckham¹⁴, Sang Seck Park¹⁵, P.J. Vatikiontis¹⁶, Moshe Lissak¹⁷, Claude E. Weleh Jr. and Arthur K. Smith¹⁸, J. Stephen Hoadley¹⁹ etc. have analyzed the various factors and trends which from time to time developed as a result of the civil military relationship and have outlined five broad factors or their absence mainly responsible for the intervention of military in politics. They are: (i) the internal organization of the military establishment (ii) socio-economic development, (iii) level of political institutionalization, (iv) professionalism and civilian control of the military, and (v) foreign influence and proximity of other military coups²⁰.

There is a need also to say briefly about militarism. It is considered to be a doctrine or system that "values war and accords primacy in state and society to the armed forces. It exalts a function - the application of violence - and an institutional structure - the military establishment. It implies both a policy orientation and a power relationship²¹. Lawrence I. Radway, "Militarism" in David L. Shells (eds.),

International Encyclopedia of the Social

Generally speaking, the militants have preferred violence or coercive methods to check the domestic crisis, but as far as the military ideology is concerned, it in clear terms rationalizes its use primarily in foreign affairs. On the other hand a fully militarized social set up recognizes privileged position for warriors. In the extreme case, the armed forces unilaterally and arbitrarily determine the nature and needs of the basic institution, the choice of regimes, the rights and duties of citizens, and the share of national budget earmarked for the armed forces. In a somewhat soft case, military leaders exercise great power as partners or agents of other social groups rather than as a relatively autonomous force²².

The political power of armed forces reaches its nadir in countries which dispose with them altogether. The politicization of the military begins when the armed forces offer their advice with a threat of sanctions if the advice is not given due preference. Finer has discussed this aspect at a great length and summarized the high handed techniques some times used; threats to resign, to withdraw support, to announce disagreements publically, to demonstrate disdain for the regime, to refuse and to execute its orders or to rise up in arms. Whenever the civil administrator surrenders unilaterally to these techniques, the armed forces become more ambitious and start ruling covertly, either by exercising a veto or by substituting policies and personnel of their own choice for those of the dejure government. To further strengthen their position, they manipulate or get the election delayed, deploy the troops to intimidate those opposing or to seize key positions and the arrest or assassination of politicians. In military intervention, the armed forces usually act alone or in collaboration with the civilians. They may take the initiative or respond, more or less eagerly, to pleas from politicians. These are important distinctions²³.

The military organizations and personnel play a crucial role in determining the social, political and economic conditions of a large chunk of the global population. For many living in developing nations, the military has been the most pivotal institution shaping the quality of their existence. In some nations, the military role is explicit and public: military elites control the key government organizations by occupying positions and consider it legitimate to openly dictate national policy, dominating the mass media of communication and both public and private discussion, and military dictated

priorities supersede competing goals and policies. In other nations the military role is less obvious but important nonetheless. Military leaders may have effective access to the highest levels of national policy-making groups. Military budgets receive top priority and generally approved without any hitch regardless of other considerations or demand on limited national resources. Civilian political leadership may hold its position tenuously, dependent upon continued support from military leaders. To maintain their political positions, it is not possible for the civilian leaders to alienate the military opinions, while taking major political decisions. However, obvious of inconspicuous the relationship to national life, there is a little doubt that the military institution is inextricably involved not only in politics but in determining the outcome of every major social process²⁴.

Jame Eayrs lists six purposes which a military establishment may serve:

1. Strategic
2. Insurance
3. Law and Order (domestic and foreign)
4. Modernization and Development
5. Ceremony
6. Diplomatic

In his elaboration of six points, strategic forces are seen as being maintained primarily to attack one or more states, or to deter one or more states from attacking the homeland, or to defeat the attacker if he is not deterred. The strategic is the original, primary, military function. In the case of insurance, an army is regarded as something which might be needed one day because the states system is maligned, and the international environment is hostile, under law and order (domestic) aiding the civil power by providing emergency relief and civil defence facilities.. The foreign aspect of this role is generally known as peace keeping and includes duties in support of the UN. Use of arms to bring about modernization and development applies particularly to under-developed nations. The swiftest and surest way for a newly independent country to create the rudiments of a skilled labour force may be to conscript for service in the armed forces. The ceremonial role of armies is one which few states in history have done away with completely, and even the Vatican City keeps an armed force of Swiss guards. Finally, within the context of the diplomatic

function, comes the international public relations, propaganda, intelligence, the encouragement of allies, the search for economic advantage and prestige²⁵.

The army is an important general purpose interest group in many countries, either as a single group or somewhat divided into several services. The officer's corps has always served as the brain of this metaphorical body. It held the power and capacity to give a shape or reshape the various posts of an army, if provided time, money and equipment. It is the officer corps which we generally consider as central to an understanding of the mind and soul of the armies in South Asia.

The army in many countries of South Asia favours a more authoritative posture in domestic politics, and a more vigorous pressing of national territorial or ethnic claims, against various neighbours. This trend leads to the politicization of the army, making its officer's corps more ambitious and power hungry. The politicization of army with one voice has been acknowledged by the scholars and the military experts, a dangerous proposition. The conditions prevailing in South Asian countries in each and every field of life are remarkably different, of course, with some similarities. For instance, throughout South Asia, the political leaders who took over the new regimes were moderate constitutionalists, men whose outlook was largely westernized and secular and whose social origins were upper middle class, with a heavy emphasis upon professionalism and intellectual values. It was, therefore, obvious that their commitment to government by Parliament, and to law enacted by the legislatures and applied by a qualified judiciary was strong and sincere. The top leaders were having strong political base at the grassroot level and also "supported by political parties and groups whose outlook was not so consistently westernized and constitutional - and yet who were distinctly more conservative and non-revolutionary"²⁶.

If we draw up a short list of the top South Asian leaders, it reads something like that: for India, M.K. Gandhi, J.L. Nehru, Sardar Patel, for Pakistan M.A. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, for Sri Lanka, D.S. Senanayake and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. Of these seven men, only one (Senanayake) could not get the opportunity to receive education in England, either in the Inns of Court or at Cambridge or Oxford. As it happened, he was perhaps the most committed of them all to the English style of political

institutions²⁷.

As far as the politicization of armed forces in Pakistan is concerned, it started much earlier and has grown fully. It is adequate to lump the Indian and Pakistan armies together and assume that their behaviour will be similar because they share a common origin in the old British Indian Army. But there are important difference between the Indian and Pakistani Army. *First*, the periodic political involvement of the Pakistani Army has affected its relationship to the social system, when a uniformed army strides into a room of civilians, the latter buckles. The social status and power of the Pakistani Army are radically different from those of the Indian Army. It is not at all clear, however, that its greater status has meant an improvement in fighting ability. *Second*, the Pakistan Army was created from scratch in 1947. It inherited very few training institutions, it was seriously deficient in most stores, supplies and weapons, and it received far fewer officers with Staff College or advanced training than did the Indian Army. This meant that it was dependent on British Officers for its first four years, and this led to a mixed legacy of pride and bitterness at having to create a virtually new army in the face of alleged Indian hostility. Third, Pakistan was created on the basis of Two Nations Theory. The army was supposed to follow and adopt Islamic principles and practices, while the Indian Army was not bound to adopt any such practices based on religion or otherwise. *Fourth*, upon partition, India was bound to change its entire strategic outlook because of the shedding of its responsibility for the defence of the north-west frontier. It inherited the much quieter northeast frontier Ladakh and other areas.

Fifth, in the early fifties, the Pakistan Army had developed a close relationship with the foreign military establishment as it was totally dependent on them for the supply of military hardware, whereas the Indian Army did not maintain any such contacts because of the non-aligned policy adopted by the Government of India.

Sixth, in the 1950s, the Pakistan Army was completely reorganized which led to a distinct and special approach to strategy and war. The Indian Army underwent an equivalent reorganization after the Sino-Indian war of 1962²⁸.

Politics, however, has affected the army's professionalism and ability, particularly the top ranks; some lower ranking officers are embittered by

their failure to get promotions because of the political considerations. Dismemberment of Pakistan and the humiliation by India was another cause for bitterness. The officer corps is derived from families with military traditions dating back to the British colonial and *Moghul* period. The majority of officers are *Punjabis* or *Pathans*. The other ranks are also mainly derived from these ethnic groups, especially from the rural areas, the *Baluchis* have sizeable contingents in the armed forces but the number of *Sindhis* and *Muhajirs* (refugees from India) is very small.

No doubt, Pakistan's Army had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Indian Army in December 1971; the former still retains its reputation as a first class fighting force. It is highly regarded in the Middle East, and thousands of Pakistani soldiers and airmen have been sent abroad to bolster the forces of other Muslim countries, particularly in the Persian Gulf region. These deployments not only increase Pakistan's influence in the region and contribute to the nation's balance of payments; they also help to defuse tensions within the military by providing opportunities for faster advancement for some and distant postings for other, potentially disruptive officers²⁹.

The armed forces of Pakistan constitute the largest single public employer nationally and one of the largest public employer globally. Prior to the emergence of Bangladesh, the military and particularly army, was a highly prestigious force. It is however, difficult to ascertain the damage done to the prestige of the armed forces as a result of the 1971 Indo-Pak war³⁰. Nevertheless, the armed forces suffered both tangible and intangible loss of prestige, influence and control over the Pakistani polity and decision making process as a result of this war. Z.A. Bhutto who took over as President of Pakistan immediately after the end of war, successfully replaced several top ranking military officers, indicating that top military leadership had lost its grip over the civil administration, and was not as strong, organized, or confident as it once was³¹.

No doubt, the military was demoralized for some time, but it remained an important political institution or very close to the top. In short, the influence of the military because of its traditional role and dominant position in the Pakistani social milieu, its priority with regard to public expenditure, and its able top leadership, still remained strong, if not as openly dominant as in the past. The army role in the national decision making was strong if not

dominant and its participation in both defence and civilian affairs was relevant³².

Since independence, the army has played a definite role in Pakistan, and it is considered to be highly politicized. The analysis of this phenomena will be very interesting in the sense that the Indian and the Pakistan armies emerged as a result of the partition, are assuming altogether different positions as far as this aspect is concerned. This trend demands some explanation. Stephen P. Cohen has rightly pointed out that there are armies that guard their nation's borders, there are those that are concerned with protecting their own position in society, and there are those that defend a cause of an idea. The Pakistan army does all three. Moreover, it has always regarded itself as the special expression of the idea of Pakistan and a few officers have advocated an activist role in reforming or correcting the society where it has fallen below the standard of excellence set by the militants³³.

Pakistan's top military officers admire the Indian political set up, but quite typically as in the case of an armoured division Commander who said:

Indian had a very big advantage over Pakistan in the leadership of Pandit Nehru. You have seen that inspite of the fact that his daughter had a reverse and the Janata Party had seen her out, the people of India, because of the outstanding leadership of Pandit Nehru, once they saw that the other party is not good, and then they ran back to her. So they have a very big advantage whereas we are a little unfortunate. You know at the time of partition, we had a reversal. The Qaid-i-Azam (M.A. Jinnah) had died, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali had died, the other Prime Minister had gone away and then the cult was mediocrity, the politicians were not trained and we had political confusion for ten to twelve years. People thought that the country is gone and that is the reason this professional army was called in, because there was some leadership in it. These Martial Laws have come in and they have been very hard on the army, but there was no way out. Gradually, now these politicians know that to be a leader, you have to be a leader-but there have been lapses. But India has had a family; God Almighty was very kind to them³⁴.

There is no doubt that after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, no leader of calibre who could run the affairs of Pakistan in an effective manner was available. The Muslim League was unable to present the public a convincing programme or an inspiring leader. For its survival it had to

seek the support of the local politicians and to raise the local issues³⁵.

The political environment in Pakistan in the beginning was so complex that it could not be possible to frame a Constitution for country. The electorates of Pakistan were pre-dominantly rural. They could only understand either a general idea “such as the triumph of Islam, or a very particular idea, such as the curtailment of the power of this landlord or that policeman.” *Jagirdars* and *Zamidars*, *Pirs* and *Mirs*, *Makhdooms*, *Khans* and *Nawabs* were having vast political influence and were active in political life. The political map of Pakistan particularly of West Pakistan was dotted with the signs of entrenched areas of personal political power³⁶. Such landlords and big businessmen were having firm control on the levers of the government machinery of Pakistan. The big landlords from the West Punjab - Malik Feroz Khan Noon, Mushtaq Ahmed Gwmani, Mian Mumtaz, Mohammed Daultana, Syed Ahmed Nawab, Shan Gardezi and Iftkhar Hussain Khan Mamdot and the biggest landlords from Sind, such as Mohammad Ayub Khusro and Mir Ghulam Ali Talper were the members of the Constitution making body of Pakistan and the legislative assemblies of the provinces and governments. They shared power with descendants of the landed aristocracy, members of the rich and distinguished Muslim families from India, leaders of the Muslim League who had migrated from Pakistan to India, like Liaquat Ali Khan, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Ismail Ibrahim Choudhri and S.A. Azam. That was why from the outset the political actions and reactions and the policies pursued by the ruling elite of Pakistan were solely based on one main consideration. They wanted the greatest possible consolidation of the semi-feudal landlords and the big bourgeoisie of West Pakistan in all spheres of country's economic and political life. The alluring promises given to the Muslim working people on the eve of the partition were forgotten, and even mere mentioning of these promises was a crime³⁷.

The big landlords who were enjoying enormous political power were against introducing any changes in the then agrarian system prevailing in Pakistan, particularly in the West³⁸.

During the period which immediately followed Qaid-i-Azam's death there developed a fierce competition for influence, wealth, power and prestige between the various interests and personalities which made up political life? The arena in which this competition has first manifested itself was the

organization for framing the Constitution which was to give formal expression to Pakistan's policy³⁹.

The political instability of Pakistan in the first decade of its existence opened the door for the army intervention. At the domestic level, the people were fed up with the frequent changes in country's leadership⁴⁰. The political parties in Pakistan became the vehicle for politicians' political career. Generally, the new parties were formed when a career seemed to be making no progress in an old party. Some parties were formed almost entirely from among members of legislatures, and constituted, in effect, a temporary group within an assembly for the purpose of making or breaking a ministry. These factors hampered the growth of a workable system of responsible government⁴¹. Most of this period (from 1947-1956) was spent in trying to reach some constitutional consensus. During this period, the only institutional development which took place within the civilian and military bureaucracies, cabinets and Prime Ministers came and went, but the civil servants and the military leadership retained positions of importance and power to the new state⁴².

Keith Callard, writing before the Army formally took over power said, "In Pakistan political parties waxed, waned and suffered eclipse. Political leaders have argued and reduced each other to importance. Men of religion have laid claim to complete authority and have achieved almost none. In the meanwhile, the state has been run largely by the civil service backed by the army which has carried much as it did before independence"⁴³.

Hasan Askari Rizvi, a Pakistani scholar and a keen observer of the politicization of military in Pakistan strongly felt that the major responsibility "falls on the shoulders of the political leadership." He has identified five factors for an increasing participation of the military in non-military governance of the state: (i) in the sense of insecurity of the new state following the partition riots and demographic shifts, the military moved with determination to provide stability, (ii) the weak social base and disarray of the political leadership and erosion of political institutions (iii) discipline and cohesion of the military and bureaucracy, (iv) utility of skills for civil purposes, and (v) the high prestige of the military as a competent, impartial and effective organization⁴⁴. The gradual deterioration of conditions inside Pakistan gave rise to two closely related trends in Pakistan. First, the calls to the army to help the civil government in the maintenance of law

and order gradually increased. Second, the military became an important factor in the decision making of Pakistan. President Ayub Khan in his autobiography made it clear that the “unprincipled” behaviour of Pakistani landlords, lawyers and civil servants-turned politicians led directly to the October 1958 coup. Laporate feels that military bureaucrats in league with:

President Iskandar Mirza chose to move and perform the coup in the name of Parliamentary corruption and immorality is undeniable. At any rate the instability of this period and out of Parliament to appease the military civilian bureaucratic coalition did contribute to the abandonment of Parliamentary democratic facade⁴⁵.

On 7 October 1958 General Mohammad Ayub Khan was appointed as a Chief Martial Law Administrator. Under a President’s proclamation Ayub Khan in a statement on Radio Pakistan on 8 October 1958 traced conditions under which the President was compelled to declare Martial Law. More or less he blamed the politicians for creating chaotic conditions. They had nothing constructive to offer, they used provincial feelings, sectarian religious and racial differences to set a Pakistani against a Pakistani. In the mad rush for power and acquisition all that matters was self-respect⁴⁶. President Ayub Khan tried to provide a political set up for Pakistan based on the concept of Basic democracy but failed. He also projected himself as a civilian President, but slowly and gradually the situation went out of control and on March 25, 1969, in the conditions of growing instability President Ayub Khan resigned and handed over power to the leaders of the Pakistan Army headed by Commander-in-Chief General Yahya Khan. He provided an opportunity to the people of Pakistan to elect their representatives by secret ballot.

For a brief period January 1972- July 1977, Pakistan people saw the civilian rule, headed by Z.A. Bhutto. He was able to inject a new enthusiasm in the political scene of Pakistan and to strengthen his political position, concluded a Tripartite Agreement with the National Awami Party and the *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam* on March 6, 1972 and by promulgating an Interim Constitution for Pakistan⁴⁷. But after some time he started facing rough weather at home. His Pakistan’s People Party (PPP) was also in trouble as left was being purged and the old conservative forces surfaced. Bhutto’s own behaviour disillusioned many. He was working in an

authoritarian way and “over centralization of decision making, not delegation of authority” was his style of functioning. He perceived himself as personifying the political system of Pakistan, and was “convinced that the country’s stability correlates with his longevity in office⁴⁸.”

Bhutto, a seasoned politician was well aware of the politicized nature of Pakistan Army. He was successful in putting curb on the role of army to what it should be in a democratic set up. To army, namely defending the border of the country from external invasion, and render assistance to the civilian administration in the maintenance of internal law and order, when specifically asked to do so. The army when Bhutto took over was totally disheartened and stood discarded. He planned to further discredit it by propagating through governmental media that it was the army which was responsible for the disintegration of Pakistan, and thus, absolving himself of a responsibility for the session which was attributed to him by his opponents. To further tighten his control over the army, Bhutto eased out several top officers early in 1972.

To establish upper hand of civil administration, Bhutto Government issued a White Paper of defence in the middle of 1976. The objective behind issuing the paper was to tell the armed forces that entire decision-making was concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister. He was to chair the Defence Council and also made responsible for coordinating defence with home and foreign policies⁴⁹. One of the prime objectives of Z.A. Bhutto in initiating and vigorously pursuing the nuclear weapon programme is believed to have been to reduce the power and influence of the Army by having a more potent weapon system directly under civilian control. If so he seems to have miscalculated badly. Benazir Bhutto during an interview to the NBC in December 1992 admitted that the Prime Minister has no control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and programme⁵⁰.

But with the change of political climate in the country, Bhutto realized that it won’t be possible for him to run the country and maintain his constitutional and increasingly unpopular rule, without the absolute support and loyalty of the armed forces. Bhutto otherwise maintained the armed forces in good humour, by allocating more funds and equipping these with modern weapons. Deep rooted internal problems became his compulsion in the later part of his rule⁵¹.

Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan was of the view

that in collusion with the right wing Islamic reactionaries who launched an agitation against his father's regime, the military staged the *coup d'etat* on 5 July 1977. The "reactionaries astonishingly, were so naive as to expect the army to make over power to them after it has overthrown a functioning democratic order"⁵². It was once again the fast deteriorating political situation after the March 1977 elections, which the opposition blamed was totally rigged, considered to be the main cause of army rule in Pakistan. The people of Pakistan were not strangers to army rule. From 1958, periodically the army itself or some politicians playing its game had thrown over-board the so-called Constitution of the country and the way the people of Pakistan had accepted the coup was not surprising at all. No one was prepared to accept when Z.A. Bhutto announced that he had put an end to "Bonapartism" after the proclamation of Constitution in 1973, and that henceforth there would be no coup⁵³ The Patriot, "Pak Coup" 6 July, 1977, Also see Hindustan Times, "Setback in Pakistan", 6 July 1977, The. Once in power the military, after a symbolic reprimand of the corrupt and inefficient public bureaucracy collaborated with the civil service of Pakistan, in pursuit of the effective neutralization of the traditional politicians⁵⁴.

The Army has always been regarded as politically incompetent by a wide cross section of public including professionally devoted army officers who strongly feel that prolonged interference of army in the civil administration and internal security duties, paves the way for determining the competence and discipline in armed forces. General Zia ul-Haq had found it difficult to transfer power to the politicians, hold election in the country and return to barracks because he was duly worried about his and his associates' future.

The military in Pakistan, during Zia period "did contemplate institutionalizing its role in politics by creating an entirely new Islamic system of political life which implied drastic constitutional changes, and the uprooting or intimidation of all independent centres of power including the press, the judiciary, student unions and Pakistan's already enfeebled intellectual class"⁵⁵.

General Zia tried to legitimize his rule by projecting himself as a true follower of Islam, particularly changing the political, economic, social, cultural and educational structure of Pakistan according to the teachings of *Holy Quran* and *Sunna*. He seemed to be a popular leader among the masses, and

the sharp differences between the political parties, particularly those associated with the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) had convinced the people in Pakistan that only General Zia could provide Pakistan a stable political set up.

Furthermore, there was no broad based political party having mass following at the grass roots level, a leader of Bhutto's stature who with the help of some powerful army Generals could overthrow Zia regime. It was a general impression that "Pakistan for quite some time to come is likely to be saddled with a military regime"⁵⁶. In sharp contrast to the two earlier regimes of Ayub and Yahya, the military was considered to be Zia's constituency, more than any other section of society. It was described as a true military regime in Pakistan. Zia had considered the army as the first and fundamental pillar of the regime but also wanted to assign pivotal position to the Army in the Constitution as the final custodian of the country's integrity⁵⁷.

The tragic death of Zia in a plane crash in August 1988 put an abrupt end of military rule in Pakistan. The greatest legacy he left behind more in his death than anything else is the primary role for the armed forces. Never before have the armed forces been able to dictate so effectively and with so much clout after relinquishing power, as is the case of the Benazir Government. It was for the first time even with the political order undergoing a change; the military civilian equation was more unfavourable to a democratic leadership⁵⁸. Elections were held in Pakistan and in December 1988 Benazir Bhutto became the first woman Prime Minister of Pakistan. She was to head a minority government and found the President of Pakistan Ghulam Ishaq Khan sympathetic to Islamic Democratic Alliance. Benazir had to strike political compromises in order to assume the chair of the Prime Minister. To the army, she assured that they would be free to run their own affairs, and there won't be any cut in budget allocations. To acting President, Benazir promised her support in his election as the president. The Chief of the Army staff Gen. Beg wielded strong influence. In Benazir's own words, "realistically speaking, given the present situation, it would be very difficult for any government in Pakistan to survive without the critical backing of the armed forces"⁵⁹

News Week, 16 December 1989, as cited in Veena Kukreja, "Restoration of Democracy in Pakistan". She overemphasized the link between the

people's mandate and the return of democracy forgetting that in Pakistan which is still affected by feudalism, the powerful institutional, business and landed classes are able to determining the success and longevity of any government. The swift removal of Generals, who headed the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), works the armed forces to the creation of a possible trend that threatened to encroach on their close preserve⁶⁰.

It is very much evident that the Army was not happy with the functioning of the Benazir government. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, of course, by taking the top brass of the army into confidence, dismissed Benazir Bhutto Government on 6 August 1990. The elections held in October provided an opportunity to *Islami Jamoori Ithad (IJI)* to rule the government in Pakistan. But soon after the installation of **IJI** Government, the difference between Nawaz Sharif and General Beg over domestic and foreign policies became well known, had led to the speculation of an army take over. The conflict between the Army Chief and the fledgling civilian government took a serious turn in January 1991 when General Beg publicly criticized the Government for supporting the US led coalition forces in the Gulf War. But Nawaz Sharif had successfully demonstrated that he was well aware of the predominant position of the Army in the power structure of Pakistan⁶¹.

The army has become a part of the political process of Pakistan. The then Pakistan Army Chief Lt. Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua, was considered as "liberal and pro-US" General. The appointment of General Nawaz had ended months of political uncertainty in the country where the Army had repeatedly seized power. In choosing General Nawaz, President Ishaq Khan rejected the favourites of many in ruling circles, including Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, the former Intelligence Chief who was crucial in challenging American military aid to the Afghan rebels.

It is very difficult to sideline the army in Pakistan's politics. If at all, any attempt to be made to de-politicize the military in Pakistan, it may take another 20-30 years. During this period, strong party system with the backing of peasants, industrial workers, intelligentsia etc. is to be developed which could effectively challenge the mighty army.

After the October 1993 elections in Pakistan, the army "supremacy in political system of Pakistan had taken a different shape. The top brass of the army did not interfere in the elections and watched the show from the

barracks. The elections had convinced that they should not take undue interest directly, but must contrast the levers of power and defence policy while actively staying out of politics⁶². It was widely well known that Benazir and Sharif had accepted the army's anxieties on foreign policy and security issues. The Army was determining policies in the areas most important to them without getting into the mess of day-to-day governance⁶³.

Benazir Bhutto's second shift as a Prime Minister (October 1993 - November 1996) abruptly ended when she was unceremoniously dismissed on 5 November 1996 by the President, exercising the powers vested with him under VIII amendment of the 1973 Constitution. Benazir maintained close liaison with the Army top brass but rampant corruption which resulted in the collapse of Pakistan's economy were cited some of the reasons which had compelled the President to take such a drastic step.

Pakistan was neck deep in the economic crisis. According to one estimate, Pakistan's economy was dominated by black money of \$ 2.5 billion. Annual tax evasion was said to run into \$ 16 billion. Rising inflation, a worsening balance of payments positions, a crushing foreign debt burden and low foreign exchange reserves had all combined to make it vulnerable both internally and externally. It was even feared that Pakistan's current account deficit might shoot beyond \$ 5 billion. Its foreign debt servicing had already reached \$ 2.25 billion. An estimate trade deficit was put at \$ 2.8 billions. Amidst these, harsh realities annual expenditure on defence and debt servicing combined account for more than the total revenues and nearly 70 per cent of gross revenues⁶⁴.

The gross mismanagement of the economy prompted the IMF to withhold the \$ 600 million standby assistance package. The IMF had also argued that the worsening economic conditions should make Pakistan either cancel or at least postpone some major defence programmes, such as the \$ 2.4 billion deal for 30 Mirage 2000..... Going by the IMF conditionalities, some aspects suggest that the axe might fall on the proposed \$ 550 million deal with Ukraine for 300 T-80 U D main battle tanks and three submarines from France, estimated to cost \$ 950 million. As things stood, Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister of Pakistan, would not be able to touch the defence expenditure. The Army Chief Gen. Jahangir Karamat had given his mind in this regard, on the day Sharif was sworn in

as Prime Minister⁶⁵. Notwithstanding Sharif's massive mandate, one had to constantly keep in mind the Army's predominant position in Pakistan's politico-administrative set up. Few days before the elections, the President of Pakistan had announced the formation of a National Security and Defence Council (NSDC). Would Nawaz Sharif wind up this outfit or would his government be under the scrutiny? Would the armed forces continue to be the final arbiters or would Nawaz Sharif be able to free himself from this extremely powerful group? All these were extremely complex and intricate issues⁶⁶.

A serious situation could, however, arise, if and when Sharif joined issues with the President on NSDC abolition or its functioning. It could be tough fight as all three Chiefs of Services and Chief of General Staff was the Council members. Moreover, its authority extended to all defence, economic and law and order problems. He had also argued for economic ties within during his pre and post election speeches. But could he do so before settling the Kashmir problem, one point programme of Islamabad so far? Would the armed forces allow him? In fact, chalking out a line which keeps the military

Confined to barracks is desirable for democracy to take strong roots in Pakistan. All it was difficult to imagine Nawaz Sharif doing so⁶⁷.

President Leghari who drew much of his power from the 8th Amendment, was then in a fix after repealing of the controversial amendment by the Sharif Government. No doubt Presidency of Pakistan had lost its glamour but only time would tell the future role of Army in Pakistan's politics. The all powerful service Chiefs, who had upgraded and legitimized their own position through the CDNS, would leave no stone unturned in safeguarding and strengthening this newly created institution as well as their own turf within the armed forces.

Studying the ties between the military and politics in Pakistan boils down to the role of armed forces in the definition and conduct of politics or describing the relations that the armed forces maintain with the politicians, both upstream and downstream from political decisions. That became a hot subject with context of military coup of 12 October 1999 which was a third seizure of power by the military since the gaining of independence in 1947. Pakistan, a unique case in South Asia, for in the other countries of this immensely populated and extremely troubled region, the military

plays a role that may be described as more normal although it is sometimes difficult to define normality⁶⁸.

For several years, the military had given the impression of not wanting to assume power directly. They were satisfied to remain as it were the guarantors of democracy while ensuring, in particular, the holding and proper conduct of elections. But they could not accept being under the supervision of the political power, the forced resignation of October 1998 of the General Jehangir Karamat from his post as Army Chief of Staff threw a cold which was at the origin of the resentments of the military with regard to the Prime Minister. The withdrawal, imposed politically by Washington, on Pakistani troops and the Mujahiddins from the Kargil heights in Kashmir left a profound malaise. The military blamed the Prime Minister for the failure⁶⁹.

Even during the civilian rule in Pakistan, the generals have exercised political influence through the intelligence apparatus, notably the (ISI) organization. The ISI plays a behind the scenes role in exaggerating political divisions to justify military intervention. Partly due to the role of the military and partly because of their own weakness, Pakistan's political fashions have often found it difficult to cooperate with one another or to submit to the rule of law. As a result, Pakistan is far from developing a consistent system and stable form of government, with persisting political polarization along three major, interesting fault lines: between civilians and the military, among different ethnic and provincial groups, and between Islamists and secularists⁷⁰.

The first crack in contemporary Pakistan's body politic continues to be this perennial dispute over who should wield power. Musharraf has described Pakistan as "a very difficult country to govern" in view of its myriad internal and external difficulties. Musharraf's view reflects the thinking of the Pakistani military and is possibly self-serving. The military does not allow politics to take a definite shape, generally accusing elected leaders of compromising national security or of corruption. Repeated military intervention has deprived Pakistan of political leaders with experience governing leading to serious lapses under civilian rule. Because the military periodically cooperates or fires civilian politicians, established and accepted rules for political conduct have failed to evolve. Issues such as the role of religion in matters of state, the division of power between

various branches of government, and the authority of the provinces are not settled by constitutional means or through a vote. The military does not let civilian rule, but its own rule lacks legitimacy in the eyes of general public, creating an atmosphere of permanent friction. Thus instead of governing, Pakistan rulers, including Musharraf have been managing ethnic, religious and provincial tensions⁷¹.

The second major source of conflict in Pakistan is based on these ethnic and provincial differences. Although the majority of Pakistan's ethnically disparate population has traditionally identified with secular politicians, that majority has not always determined the direction of Pakistan's policies, even when its opinion is expressed in a free and fair election. Highly centralized and unrepresented governance has created grievances among different ethnic groups, and the state has yet to create any institutional mechanism for dealing with such discontent. The constitutional provisions relating to provincial autonomy which could place to each province by allowing self government have often been by passed in practice. Intraprovincial differences, such as those between the Baluchis and the Pashtuns in Baluchistan, between the Panjabis and Saraiki in Punjab, between the Pashtuns and Hindko speakers in the North West Frontier Province, and between the Sindhis and the Mohajirs in Sind, have also festered without political resolution⁷².

The third relates to the ideological division over the role of Islam in national life. Having started out as a pressure group outside the Pakistan parliament, Pakistan's religious parties have now become a well armed and well financed force that wield considerable influence within civilian branches of government. Religious groups have benefited from the patronage of the military and civil bureaucracy, which has viewed them as useful tools in perpetuating the military's control over foreign and domestic policy. Because the Islamist world views incompatible with the vision of a modern Pakistan, the violent vigilantism of some Islamists has become a serious threat to Pakistan civil society and has also promoted sectarian terrorism. Operating outside the framework of the rule of law, the Islamists have the potential to disrupt the conduct of foreign policy, especially in view of their support for anti-Indian militants in Kashmir and the Taliban in Afghanistan⁷³.

Pakistan's rulers have traditionally attempted to "manage" militant Islamists, trying to calibrate it so that it serve the state's national building function

without destabilizing internal politics or relations with western countries. The success of the Jihadist experiment against the Soviets encouraged Pakistani's strategic planners to expand the Jihad against India and into post Soviet-Central Asia. Pakistan's sponsorship of the Taliban in Afghanistan, together with the presence in its territory of Islamist militants from all over the world, derived from Islamabad's desire to emerge as the centre of a global Islamic resurgence. Ironically, religious fervour did not motivate all Pakistani leaders who supported this strategy; in most cases, they simply embraced Islam a politico-military strategic doctrine that would enhance Pakistan's prestige and positions in the world. The focus on building an ideological state, however has subsequently, caused Pakistan to lag behind in almost all areas that define a functional modern state⁷⁴.

In the last few years, the situation has deteriorated even further. The Islamists are not content with having a secondary role in national affairs and have acquired a momentum of their own. Years of religious, rhetoric have influenced a younger generation of military officers. The ISI, in particular, includes a large number of officials who have assimilated the Islamic beliefs; they were rhetorically called on to support in the course of Jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Because Musharraf and the Pakistani military still see secular politicians, rather than the Islamists, as their rivals for political power, they have continued to use Islamists for political purposes. Before the holding of 2008 elections in Pakistan; Musharraf administration sought the backing of the Islamists for a set of constitutional amendments increasing the President's power and in return recognized an Islamist as the leader of the parliamentary opposition. Major figures of the secular opposition were exiled or jailed on corruption or sedition charges, positioning the Islamists as Pakistan's major opposition group. This had enabled Islamists in the pre-election scenario in Pakistan to exercise greater influence than would have been possible in an open, democratic political system, given the post electoral performance of Islamists groups in Pakistan's intermittent elections since gaining independence⁷⁵.

General elections were held in Pakistan on 18 February 2008 and ended year of political instability and put Pakistan on the path towards civilian-led rule, even as Al-Qaeda tried its best to destabilize the state through a campaign of suicide bombers that have killed more than 800 people in the recent past. It is a general impression that Washington should be prepared to work with civilian coalition of PPP and PML (N) and recognize that

President Pervez Musharraf's role in governing the country is likely to diminish as the civilian government led by Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani finds its footing⁷⁶.

It is still difficult to overstate the importance of restoration of democratic process in Pakistan and how it will cope with rising religious extremism in some parts of the country. Pakistan's ability to overcome the challenges from religious extremists will be a significant determinant of the ultimate outcome of the struggle against Al-Qaeda inspired global terrorism⁷⁷.

The US channeled more than \$ 5 billion in mostly military aid to Musharraf's regime since 2001. The results: Musharraf pursued a policy of accommodation, truces, ceasefires and autonomy with the Taliban dominated tribal leaders of the North West Frontier Region of Pakistan even as he claimed to be putting down the insurgents.

The religious political parties allied with the Taliban lost big in the parliamentary elections. That's a sign that Pakistan's tradition of secular politics is healthy and showing muscle. Voters appeared to be saying from the top of the house that between the ballot box and a more forceful stand against Islamic insurgents, the Taliban tide can be repelled. The question is whether Pakistan's military has the capacity to carry out the people's wishes. So far, it has proved incapable.

There is a popular saying in Pakistan, that while every country has an army, in Pakistan the army has a country. Sound a bit of cliché but like most clichés there is a degree of truth in it. And its roots are historical. According to I.A. Rehman, Chairman of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, "Pakistan came into being in August 1947 in circumstance that made its founding fathers acutely conscious of its security needs. To an extent this was understandable as the State had no history of its own; it had been born in a climate of tension and hostility with a bigger neighbor (India), and with quite a few question marks on its ability to survive." Fear of India made its leaders to give priority to the development of a powerful army and strengthening of the military capability of the country. This obsession with security has meant concentration and centralization of power in the hands of the military at the detriment of political parties. Since its inception, Pakistan has been under direct military dictatorship for more than half its life so far. The rest of the time there have been some kinds of transition towards democracy. Although the political trajectory

of Pakistan does give us an impression of an eternal return in rhythmic succession of cycles of about ten years, in the course of which democratic phases and military governments alternate. This is for most part mere optical illusion, since Pakistan has never really coasted democracy.

Long period of army rule has made the army an institution in itself. The power vested in the army itself has led it to control an astonishingly vast swath of the nation's economy. The military owns everything from cement firms to construction, conglomerates to cornflake manufactures. In her latest book *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, Ayesha, reckoned the army's net worth at more than \$ 20 billion - or roughly four times the entire foreign direct investment in to the country in 2006 and 11.58% of all state land is owned by the military.

Real democracy has never thrived in Pakistan in past because landowning remains the principal social base from which politicians emerge. The educated middle class who in India gained control in 1947- is in Pakistan still largely excluded from the political process. Behind Pakistan's swings between military government and democracy lies a surprising continuity of interests; to some extent, Pakistan's industrial, military and landowning elites are all interrelated and look after one another. The deals between Musharraf, Late Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, was typical of the way the army and the politicians have shared power with minimal reference to the actual wishes of the electorate.

But all said and done, the recent upsurge in the fight for democracy is new to Pakistan. It was for the first time in the history of Pakistan that people refused to be cowed down during the emergency rule imposed by Musharraf. They instead came out in increasingly large numbers and faced police repression. They were demanding ouster of Musharraf. When Musharraf took power through a coup in 1999, there was a certain sign of relief amongst many liberal and left groups. With three stints of decade long dictatorship each of Ayub Khan, Zia ul-Haq and Parvez Musharraf, the Pakistan public has matured to understand the crux of the problem, and with the assassination of Benazir Bhutto all hope with the army to control the fanatics has all but disappeared. All liberal left and democratic forces are unanimous in their fight against the militancy.

One can say that civil-military relations in Pakistan drew on the lack of domestic institutional potential of the state to deliver on the promise of

democracy. The insecurity syndrome relating to state building at home in the context of regional security complex kept the military establishment from letting the political initiative go out of its hands, even when it was not in the government. The comparative perspectives from Latin America, Africa and Asia clearly bring out the distinct context of praetorian's, which is represented by a wide space than merely the gap between military and society. The constellation of powers ruling Pakistan has a shared policy agenda and ideological orientation. Army has always increasingly moved into the centre stage of this constellation. The function of safeguarding socio-economics and political order in Pakistan was assumed by army in the background of structural discontinuity that occurred at the time of partition. The migrant led state put in place an institutional apparatus and a tradition of constitutional thinking and practice which at least by default, prepared the ground for military takeover⁷⁸.

The history of Pakistan politics is a woeful tale of contestation for power among the Presidency, the Parliament, and the Army. Of the three, the army has always been the most powerful and well organized. Paradoxically, the army has invited itself to power each time the politicians have failed to provide a stable political environment to the common people of Pakistan. However "they leave the political scene utterly fragmented and divided, in a condition much worse than when they step in". As Hasan Askari Rizvi, a well-known analyst of Pakistani politics would argue, "the authoritarian military rule accentuates political fragmentation and divisive tendencies' and 'make(s) the task of political management difficult for any post-martial civilian regime aiming to establish itself as a genuine democratic government while not alienating the top commanders". These contributions seem to hurtle Pakistan inevitably towards alternate cycles of popular and military rules. It remains to be seen whether the present coalition can make any difference.⁷⁹

The interaction between governments and militaries has resulted in fascinating and generalized observations. Of particular relevance are the observation of two American (Stephan and Fitch) and one Argentinian (O Donnel) on twentieth century patterns. All these three authors take account of the impact of professionalism (indeed, it is central to their analyses), and find it directly influenced the armed forces governmental responsibilities and views⁸⁰.

Stephan feels that historically the armed forces were directly involved in domestic politics, not merely in the fashion of nineteenth century militarism and caudillism. As an integral part of the national political system, the military played a crucial role, helping to resolve crises through electing the formation of new governments. In other words, officers' functioned on occasions as political midwives. According to Stephan, the chief characteristics of the moderator pattern include the following:

1. The military is politicized with major political actors attempting to co-opt it.
2. The armed forces attempt to maintain institutional unity dispute political heterogeneity,
3. Under certain circumstances the armed forces are granted legitimacy by relevant political actors to act as moderators of the political system by either checking or overthrowing the executive, or avoiding the breakdown of the system as a whole, through preemptive action;
4. The nature and extent of approval given by civilians elites to the military's overthrow of the executive directly affect the formation of a winning coup coalition;
5. Both civilian elites and military officers believe that long term military direction of the political process is illegitimate; and
6. Such general value congruence results from civilian and military socialization, while military officers' social and intellectual deterrence facilitates military co-optation and continued civilian leadership.⁸¹

Notes and References

- 1 Veena Kukreja, *Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan* (New Delhi, 1985), pp. 15-16.
- 2 Joseph Frankel, *International Relations in a Changing World*, (Oxford, 1979), p. 113
- 3 Robert Laporte, Jr., *Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision Making in Pakistan* (New Delhi, 1976) p.1

- 4 Robert E. Lane, *Political Life: How People Get Involved in Politics?* (Glencal, 1959), p. 75
- 5 Karl W. Deutch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (New Delhi, 1989), pp. 58-59
- 6 Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth E. Hanson, *Interest and Ideology : The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen* (San Francisco, 1975), pp. 59-99, cited in Ibid
- 7 Robert L. Wendzel, *International Relations : A Policy Maker Focus* (New York, 1977).pp.250-252
- 8 *Ibid.*, pp. 253-56.
- 9 S.E. Finer, *The Man on the Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London, 1962), pp. 3-5. 1961).
- 11 S.E. Finer, n. 6
- 12 Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Development of New Nations: Essay in Comparative Analysis* (Chicago, 1964) .
- 13 Fred R. Von Der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, 1964).
- 14 A.R. Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil Military elations", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. VI, No. 1, Winter 1971.
- 15 Sang SeckPark, "Political System in Black Africa: Towards a New Topology", *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 3, Fall 1977.
- 16 P.J. Vantikiotis, "The Military in Politics: A Review", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. IX, No. 1, 1965.
- 17 Moshe Lissak, *Military Role in Modernization: Civil Military Reforms in Thailand and Burma* (Severy Hills, 1976).
- 18 Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil Military Relations* (North SCI Terate and Massachusetts, 1974) .
- 19 J. Stephen Hoadley, *Soldiers and Politics in South Asia: Civil Military Relations in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, 1975).
- 20 For more details see, Veena Kukreja, n.1 pp. 16-43. *Sciences*, Vol. X p. 300.
- 22 *Ibid.*
- 23 *Ibid.*, pp. 301-02.
- 24 Kenneth Fidel, "Militarism and Developments: An Introduction", in

- Kenneth Fidel (ed.), *Militarism in Developing Countries* (New Branswick, 1975), p.1.
- 25 Hugh Tinker, "South Asia at Independence:India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka", in Jayaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton: *The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration* (New Delhi, 1982), p.6.
- 26 James Eayrs, "Future Role for the Armed Forces in Canada", *Foreign Policy Review*, Vol. XXVII, April 1969 as cited in I.C.M. Bayness, *The Soldier in Modern Society* (London 1972), pp. 8-10.
- 27 Hugh Tinker, n. 25, p. 6-7.
- 28 Stephen p. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (New Delhi, 1984), pp. 133-134.
- 29 Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan" in George E. Selury (ed.) *World Encyclopedia of Political Systems*, Vol. 11, (Harlow, 1983), pp. 783-84.
- 30 For a detailed account of Indo-Pak War of 1971, see S.S. Bindra, *Indo-Pak Relations : Tashkent to Simla Agreement* (New Delhi, 1981).
- 31 Robert Laporte Jr., n.3, pp. 144-15.
- 32 *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.
- 33 *Ibid*, p. 104.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 106.
- 35 Keith B. Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study*, (London, 1957), p. 49.
- 36 *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.37 M. Afzul, "Trade Union Movement in Pakistan" *Pakistan Times*, 14 August, 1960. Also see Y.V. Canpovasky and Gordon Paionskaya, *A History of Pakistan* (London, 1957) p. 115.
- 38 *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.
- 39 L.F. Rushbrook William's, *The State of Pakistan* (London, 1966), p. 139.
- 40 From 1947, until the coup of 1958, Pakistan had total of seven Prime Ministers, From September 1956 to October 1958, four persons occupied this position. One of those I.H. Chundrigar held office only for two months.
- 41 Keith B. Callard, *Politial Process in Pakistan 1947-1957* (New York, 1959)pp. 24-25.
- 42 Robert Laporte Jr. n.3, p. 51.
- 43 Keith B.Callard,n.35p.29
- 44 Hasan Askri Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, (Lahore, 1976), p. 286.

- 45 Robert Laporte Jr.n.3, pp. 43-44.
- 46 *The Dawn*, 9 October 1958.
- 47 S.S. Bindra, *Politics of Islamisation With Special Reference to Pakistan*, (New Delhi, 1990), p. 147.
- 48 Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan: A Political Perspective", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XV, No. 7, July 1975, p. 630.
- 49 Satish Kumar, *The New Pakistan*, (New Delhi, 1978). pp. 326-27.
- 50 Jasjit Singh, "The Army in the Power Structure of Pakistan, *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XVIII, No. 7, October 1995, p. 878.
- 51 Veena Kukreja n.1, p. 125.
- 52 Benazir Bhutto, "*Pakistan : The Gathering Storm* (New Delhi, 1983), p. 12. *Tribune*, "They Had It Coming", 7 July 1977.
- 54 Bilal Hashmi, "Dragon Seed Military in the State", In Hasan Gardezi & Jamil Rashid (ed.), *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship*, (London, 1985), p. 164. 55 Lt. General Eric A. Vas (Retd.) "Pakistan Security Future" in Stephen Phillip Cohen (ed.), *The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives*, (New Delhi, 1987), p. 89.
- 56 Veena Kukreja, "Military Politics in Pakistan: Ten Years of Zia's Rule", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XII, No.5, August-1988, p. 470.
- 57 *Ibid.*, p. 451.
- 58 Abha Dixit, "Between Scyllo and Charybdis : The Legacies of Zia-ul-Haq" *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, April 1989, p. 32. *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XII, No. 11, February 1990, p. 1166.
- 60 Abha Dixit, "Pakistan: After a Year of Benazir Rule", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XIII, No. 2, May 1990, p.200.
- 61 Mohammed Waseem, "Pakistan 's Lingerin Crisis of Dyarchy", *Strategic Digest*, Vol. XIII, No. 12, December 1992, p.1602.
- 62 Kalim Bahadur, "Pakistan Back to Square One", *Hindustan Times*, 17 October 1993
- 63 Veena Kukreja, "Pakistan 's 1993 Elections : Back to Square One", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XVI, No. 10, January 1994, p. 1364.64 Hari Jai Singh, "Pakistan Today", *The Tribune*, 6 March 1997.
- 65 *Ibid.* Also see B.M. Bhatra, "Pakistan 's Ailing Economy," *Hindustan Times*, 20 February, 1997.
- 66 K. Natwar Singh, "Choices and Challenges", *Mainstream*, Vol. XXXV, No.

- 12, 1 March 1997, p. 10.
67. Kuldip Nayyar, "Pakistan : After the Polls", *Hindustan Times*, 21 February 1997.
68. Aoin Lamballe, "Army and Politics in Pakistan," see, [www.svabhinava.org/indochina/Alain Lamballe/Army Politics Pakistan P/ p](http://www.svabhinava.org/indochina/Alain_Lamballe/Army_Politics_Pakistan_P/p).
69. *Ibid.*
70. Hussain Haqqani, "The Role of Islam in Pakistan's Future", *The Washington Quarterly* Vo. XXVIII, No.1, Winter 2004-05, p 87.
71. *Ibid*, pp 87-88
72. *Ibid*, p.88
73. See for more details, S.S. Bindra , *Politics of Islamisation: With Special Reference To Pakistan* (New Delhi, 1999)
74. Hussain Haqqani, n.70, p.88
75. *Ibid.*, pp 88-90
76. *Ibid.*
77. Lisa Curtis, "Pakistan: Historic Election Reinforces Democracy" See, [www.heritage.org/Research/Asia and the Pacific /wm 1819.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Asia_and_the_Pacific/wm1819.cfm).
78. See for more details, Hamza Alvi, "Authoritarianism and Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan Politics" in A Abdel Malek, (ed.) *The Post-colonial State in South Asia* (London, Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp 30-35, Yunas Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan 1937-1958* (New Delhi, Sage, 1995) pp 124-130; A.R.Siddiqi, *The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality* (Lahore, Vanguard, 1996) Chapter is 7 and 8.
79. Ashok K. Behuria, "From Fragmentation to Coalition: End of General Musharraf's Politics?" *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 32, No. 3, May 2008, pp. 337-338.
80. For brief discussion of the contrasts between militarism" and Caudillism" see Robert L. Gilmore *Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela 1810-1910* (Ohio University Press, 1964) pp 3-17. Hopkins Press, 1978); Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic- Authoritarianism Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1973).
81. See, Alford Stephen, *The Military in Polirts: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton University Press, 1971); John Samul Fitch, *The Coup d' Etat as a Political Process*. Ecuador, 1946-1966 (Baltimore; John).

