

Labor Justice in Global Manufacturing: New Actors for Revitalizing Industrial Relations

Md. Ismail Hossain & Renata Semenza

The most unwanted consequences of global manufacturing is the sweatshop condition at the workplace. It is argued that tripartite employment relations do not work effectively due to unequal power relations among the actors and state's inability to regulate labor across the globe. Based on empirical evidence from Bangladesh Readymade Garments industry, the paper argues that fair participation of workers in collective bargaining will not be effective until global actors have extended their support to increase labor power, and put pressure on the state and corporations to respect labor rights.

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Introduction

The enforcement of neo-liberal economic globalization has stimulated the global manufacturing process through which capital shifts to developing countries for production and goods are brought back to developed countries for consumption. While people living in developing countries welcome global manufacturing for expansion of employment opportunities, unjust labor practices are shouldered on them. Vulnerable and exploitative labor conditions at global manufacturing sites have provoked strong debate about the ways of ensuring justice for global workers. Many industrial relations experts have argued that unjust labor conditions can be improved or eliminated by tripartite industrial relations system (e.g. Dunlop, 1958; Shen & Benson, 2008). However, tripartite industrial relations system faces great criticism for its ineffectiveness due to unequal power

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relations between the actors. In the demise of tripartite consultation, role of multinational corporations within the value chain has become crucial. Scholars who subscribe to this trend (Gereffi, 1994; Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Schrage, 2004; Mamic, 2004) conceive the idea that corporations hold power and also intend to improve working conditions because the consumers' movement against firms for violating labor rights jeopardizes the 'name and fame' of the company that may reduce their market competitiveness. Therefore, multinational corporations have developed their own "codes of conduct" combining core conventions of ILO and local labor laws to regulate labor practices of their overseas suppliers (Kaufman et al., 2004; Mamic, 2004). Brand companies have developed codes of conduct to achieve competitive advantages in the global market through increasing brand value and reputation based on the belief of corporate social responsibility (CSR). However, the effectiveness of CSR is constrained by corporations' impetus for profit maximization, greater competition in the market place, and insufficient state protection of labor rights. Greater concerns of the consumers can force the MNCs to be more responsible towards global labor justice (Mahon & Wartick, 2003; Esbenshade, 2004; Siltaoja, 2006). Therefore, the existing scholarship on employment relations triggers some unresolved questions such as, how and to what extent the traditional employment relations are functioning for ensuring labor justice at global factories? Who are the newly emerging actors and what roles are played by them for ensuring labor justice? This pa-

per addresses these questions based on empirical evidences from Readymade Garment (RMG) industry of Bangladesh.

Defining Industrial Relations

The foremost and mostly used paradigm in 'Industrial Relations' (IR) system was the classical one developed by Dunlop. According to Dunlop (1958: 47) industrial relations systems are a composition of certain actors, contexts and ideology that binds IR systems together, and a body of rules created to govern the actors at the work place and work community. He identified three actors in IR system: (1) a hierarchy of managers and their representatives in supervision; (2) a hierarchy of workers and any of their representative; and (3) specialized government agencies concerned with workers, enterprises and their relationships. Collective bargaining is considered as the heart of industrial relations. According to its definition, collective bargaining occurs between an employer or employers' organization, and the representatives of employees. However, a neutral third party (the state) is required to stimulate the collective bargaining process which leads to a tripartite system. In a tripartite system, popularly known as tripartite employment relations, the government consults representatives of employers and workers, and involves them in the formulation of socio-economic policies and, in particular, in the legal framework of labor relations at the national and industry levels (Shen & Benson, 2008). However, the emergence of neo-liberal economic systems diminishes the potentials of traditional tripartite model of gov-

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ernance due to the decline of state power in regulating the labor. Considering the recent changes in global production systems, many scholars (Bellemare, 2000; Kessler & Bach, 2011; Donaghey et al., 2014) have argued for inclusion of new actors across the globe. Bellemare (2000:386) provided the expanded definition of industrial relation actor as "...an individual, group, or an institution that has the capability, through its action, to directly influence the industrial relation process, including the capability to influence the causal powers deployed by other actors in the IR environment. ... To be a genuine actor, one must not only take action, but also have the capacity to take one's actions into consideration and to respond favorably to some of one's expectations or demands".

According to Bellemare, end users (consumers) are significant actors in IR systems because they can force global buyers to respect labor rights at the work place. Kessler and Bach (2011) also affirm the citizen-consumer as important actors in industrial relations system. According to the above definitions, a number of actors are directly or indirectly involved in shaping the IR system, namely, the traditional industrial actors (employers' organizations, employees' associations, and the state), and non-traditional newly emerging actors (multinational corporations, human rights and civil so-

ciety organizations, consumer groups and social workers). Although the newly emerging actors are not the core part of tripartite industrial relations, they can take a central role of influencing the behavior of individual actors engaged in industrial relations system.

Data Sources & Methods

This study follows a qualitative research design within a framework of extended case method. Extended case method seeks to locate everyday life experiences in its extra-local and historical context, that is, how a specific social situation varies from place to place and how it has changed over time. It integrates broader economic and political forces in studying social situations. Burawoy (1998:7) says: "The extended case method applies reflexive science to ethnography in order to extract the general from the unique, to move from the "micro" to "macro" and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on pre-existing theory". Extended case method is usually used in the field where wider knowledge is available and the aim is to extend the existing knowledge. The research that followed extended case method uses multiple sources (e.g.; observation, interviews, informal talks, focus group discussions) for acquiring real information. Data was generated through the experiences of the author's fieldwork on four RMG factories located in different parts of Dhaka city and surrounding areas, namely, Ashulia, Uttara, Tongi and Gazipur, the main industrial hubs of Bangladesh. Among the four factories,

two were taken from each of the area of Export Processing Zones (EPZs)¹ and Non-EPZs areas of which one is large and another is small. The field work was conducted in two phases. The first phase was accomplished during the period from January to June 2013. The researchers spent the first four weeks for collecting different documentary information from the concerned ministries and offices, such as Ministry of Labor and Employment, Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), Bangladesh Export Promotion Zone Authority (BEPZA), Bangladesh Institute of Labor Studies and collected their reports, periodicals, bulletins, and visited their web pages. The researchers spent a large amount of time engaging in informal discussions with different stakeholders. During field work, interviews were conducted with 71 research participants which included 30 female workers, 18 employer/management staff, 6 representatives from six workers' unions, 3 representatives from the concerned government offices (the Ministry of Labor, the Directorate of the Inspection of Factory and Establishment, and BEPZA), 2 representatives from the BGMEA, 4 NGO staff members, 4 representatives from Buyers/Brand Companies, and 3 labor experts. Female workers selected for the interviews were between the ages of 18 and 45, and had at least two years of experience working at RMG industry.

¹ Export Processing Zone (EPZ) is a specialized industrial area developed and protected by the state to attract foreign investors. Ownership of the factories located in EPZs belongs to foreign investor or joint partnership of both local and foreign investors.

During the visit to sample factories, the researchers keenly observed the working conditions at factory, particularly the cleanliness, workplace safety, air and ventilation, sufficiency of washrooms, situation of emergency exit, conditions of baby care room and rest rooms. The second phase was the follow up research that took place during the period from November to December 2014 focusing on Rana Plaza disaster and collected data using in-depth interviews and focus group discussions concentrating on contrasting issues raised by the research participants during interviews, such as workplace harassment, workers' voices against injustices, and involvement of global brands and consumers in compensation and rehabilitation of disaster victims.

IR System In Bangladesh

The history of industrial relations system and collective bargaining in Bangladesh is not too long. A major development in the legal framework of industrial relations was the enactment of the 'East Pakistan Trade Union Act 1965' and 'Labor Dispute Act 1965'. These two laws became the foundation of 'Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969' formulated by the Pakistani Government that permitted collective bargaining in Bangladesh (Rashid, 2006). Immediately after Independence, Bangladesh declared a labor policy in 1972 recommending the reduction of trade union activities, and all the democratic rights of workers were completely banned through the imposition of 'Emergency Power Ordinance 1974' (Faruque, 2009). The right to freedom of association was restored by Industrial

Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977, but this situation further worsened through the imposition of the 'Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance 1982' with which the military government suspended trade union activities, strikes, and freedom of association. During the military regime, Bangladesh Export Processing Zone Authority (BEPZA) Act of 1980 was enacted restricting the right of forming trade union and collective bargaining. After the fall of the military regime in 1990, workers and union leaders demanded effective implementation of trade union rights. As a response the government formed the National Labor Law Commission in 1992, which submitted the report through consultation with the workers' representatives, CBA leaders, employers' representatives, civil society members and NGOs (Faruque, 2009) but this report did not come into force. Accordingly, discontent workers, mainly in the Readymade garment sector² started to raise their voices outside the factory premises in the form of vandalism, strikes, road blockings and demonstrations causing a serious threat to the sustainability of the Readymade Garment industry. Perceiving the horrendous effect of labor unrest on export earnings, the government was compelled to open the door for social dialogue and a tripartite committee was formed to settle industrial disputes. A landmark outcome of social dialogue was the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on June 2006 among the government, the BGMEA, and

leaders of the workers which later became the foundation of labor law.

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Being pressurized by many labor NGOs, as well as the United States (the main importing country of Bangladeshi garments), Government passed the 'Industrial Relations Act of 2004' giving right to workers to form associations (Faruque, 2009). The succeeding government passed the 'EPZ Workers Welfare Association and Industrial Relations Act 2010' in 2009 keeping the provisions of formation and regulation of workers welfare association, process of collective bargaining and dispute resolution, formation of labor and appeal tribunal, functions and power, conditions for strikes and lockouts, dismissal of unions, and so on. In spite of some practical limitations in forming trade unions, the 'Labor Law 2006' and 'EPZ Workers Welfare Association and Industrial Relation Act 2010' were the main legal documents that shaped the industrial relations in Bangladesh.

The Tripartite IR system

In a tripartite industrial relations system, representatives of workers and employers play key roles in representing the interest of the members of their respective organizations. Government agencies play a neutral role, standing between

² RMG is the largest and fast growing manufacturing industry in Bangladesh which employs about 4 million workers.

two competing interest groups; their main tasks involve regulating, encouraging, moderating, conciliating or even attributing negotiations where necessary (Simpson, 1994).

Employers' Association: Employer's association is the main driver for sound industrial relations that can undertake many welfare schemes for the workers including wages and other labor benefits. However, they are reluctant to uphold workers' rights fearing to lose competition in the global market. Employers can stay in the business only by selling goods, at or below, the prices of worldwide competitors, and they can do it by paying minimum wages and curtailing other labor benefits (Yan & Weiqing, 2006; So, 2010). As a result, wages and labor benefits remain below the minimum which is reflected in a worker's statement: "If you suddenly visit our factory you will see how we work there. Though the work floor is equipped with light and fans, it is always too hot and over-crowded. The way of emergency exit room is too narrow, just as a show case. Wash rooms are insufficient, dirty and lack of toiletries. If we ask them for soap or towels, manager angrily asks us: have you ever seen these items at your home throughout your life?"

Workers' testimonies affirm that employers possess higher power in the industrial relations system. For uncompromising attitudes of the employers, collective negotiation never takes place and decisions are unilaterally taken by the employers (Daneker, 2002). The inter-

viewed employers and management staffs did not refute the workers' claims, rather they argued that limiting union rights at the factory is necessary to sustain the factory. One employer said: "Allowing workers' association in the RMG sector will be suicidal for this industry. If workers are allowed to form organizations at the factory, union leader will directly come to manager's office and will force employers to accept their undue demands. Then, employers will have no alternative except to lay off the factory personnel".

Many management staffs admit the importance of collective bargaining but express their helpless position in the competitive global market.

At the same time, many management staffs admit the importance of collective bargaining but express their helpless position in the competitive global market. According to their views, owners hold relatively little power in the global market. It is a great threat for survival to increase the production cost by paying higher wages and other labor benefits. In spite of employers' limitation fostered by price competition in the global market, management staffs reported that there was scope to do things for the benefit of the workers by the employers' capacity. However, employers cannot do anything until a collective decision is made by the employers' association, because it may create dissatisfaction among workers and jeopardize the production system.

State & Government Offices: Scholars have argued that the state can actively promote labor rights by guaranteeing a floor below which wages and working conditions should not be allowed to fall (Young, 2006; So, 2010). State has the power to enact and enforce law by respecting global labor standards and there are some state led institutions to monitor and regulate the labor market aimed at protecting the rights of all parties involved in industrial relations system. First, the interviews with union organizers, labor scholars, and NGOs' representatives confirm that formulation of new labor policy is influenced by employers. A union organizer as well as a leader of a left-wing political party said: "Labor rights cannot be improved without having a labor friendly industrial policy and its successful enforcement. However, our state is yet to accomplish it. The main barrier comes from the industrialists who are the members of the legislative body of the state. They influence the government to protect their rights while enacting new labor laws".

Second, many of the respondents, including union leaders and labor scholars, strongly believe that if enforcement mechanisms are strengthened labor rights would be significantly improved. Due to the influence of industrialists and corrupt practices of the concerned departments monitoring and inspection systems do not work effectively. The frequent industrial accidents recount the poor inspection and regulatory machinery of the state. The very recent two tragic incidents which caused more than 1500 workers to die were the result of poor inspection sys-

tems and violations of the provisions of labor law.³ Third, the Bangladesh labor law of 2006 has kept the provisions of labor courts to settle the disputes between employers and employees. Workers hardly get the benefits of the labor court due to the lengthy trial process. Workers usually search for alternative ways to settle these matters even though it is less beneficial to them⁴ instead of going to labor court.

Workers' Union: An organized and self dependent union is a necessary requirement to place the demands to the authority. Cook et al (1992:107) have identified two major functions for trade unions: collective bargaining and union education. This study has found no existence of unions at the workplace. With the absence of unions at the factory, workers' cannot place any collective demand to the authority, and the educational role of unions is almost non-existent. Interviews with dif-

³ The first event was fire at Tajrin Fashions in October, 2012 which took lives of 124 workers. The most tragic event was factory building collapse at Savar in April 2013. From the debris, rescuers recovered 1134 dead bodies and around 500 workers were missing. Scholars and activists claimed that it could be possible to avoid huge losses of lives if factory owners didnot violate the law. In both the cases owners' compelled the workers to work though the possible disaster was apprehended few hours ago.

⁴ Due to lack of knowledge and financial hardship, they go to federations' office that brought the case to the arbitration committee. If federations fail to settle the dispute through arbitration committee, they bring it to the labor court. Federations take fair share of the benefits from the workers for their legal or other support if they win in the case. Therefore, federations usually deal with the wage related issues.

ferent stakeholders have revealed various reasons for the nonexistence of unions. First, workers find little interest in joining trade unions and their participation in unions is very low for lack of knowledge. Since, RMG factories are dominated by women workers, the low density of labor participation in unions is influenced by gender biased views. While male dominated unions place little importance on the rights concerning women workers, women workers feel that organizing activities and leadership are best suited to men (see also Hossain, Mathbor & Semenza, 2013). Second, local labor law does not provide full freedom of forming associations at the workplace. The provision of requiring prior approval from the management is a strategic way for employers to restrict the right of forming associations. Third, employers' repressive roles restrict workers from joining trade unions. During interviews, all respondent workers reported that they cannot form or join into trade union activities because there is every possibility of losing their jobs. Workers and union organizers reported that owners strategically keep workers away from joining trade unions. A union organizer stated the following:

“It is easy for employers to deny the rights of workers if they are unorganized because organized workers can force the employers to materialize their demands. Thus, employers always search for ways to prevent workers from organizing. As a strategy, they follow the hard rule of discharging the organizers and workers involved in such activities in order to create panic among the workers and thus prevent them from joining in association.”

The role of the WWC is not significant in ensuring labor justice for a number of reasons.

During field research a ‘Workers’ Welfare Committee (WWC)’ was found instead of workers’ union. This committee is made-up by an equal number of representatives from workers and management, usually five from each group. The role of the WWC is not significant in ensuring labor justice for a number of reasons. First, there is no organizational structure of workers. They cannot call meetings to discuss the issues relating to their interests, and cannot take any decision independently. Second, workers’ representatives in WWC do not represent all workers because no democratic processes are followed in order to select representatives. Representatives are selected by the management. For lack of sufficient representation and independent organization, representatives cannot bring any fruitful result for the workers. Therefore, it is often argued that WWC is a substitute, but not a complement to workers union. A union organizer said that workers welfare committees are a new strategy of the employers to exploit worker rights.

The study has not found any active union at the factories visited, however, there were some Union Federations⁵ working in the RMG sectors. Interviewed

⁵ Federation is constituted by a number of unions working in the same sector. There is no limit but two or more unions from the same sector can form a federation. Faruque (2009) mentioned that there are 15 garments workers federations working in Bangladesh.

workers blamed leaders of union federations for compromising role. One worker reported: “Workers’ leaders are devoted to their own interests but not to those of the workers. They favor management instead of representing workers by taking undue privileges from the employers”. Similar to other studies (e.g. Taher, 1999; Danneker, 2002; Clarke & Pringle, 2009), this study found that unions work as a catalyst of a political party instead of representing workers.

The research data confirmed that sound industrial relations were not in place due to unequal power between the actors where employers’ association held superior power. The state is indifferent to take any regulative measure being influenced by employers. Both employers and state play the role as a repressive tool that holds down the working class. Trade unions have to act in opposition to both employers and the state. This can be explained as shown in fig.2.

Fig.1 Ideal Relationship among the Actors





Fig.2 Existing Relations among the Actors



New Global Actors

Ensuring labor rights in global manufacturing is no longer confined within a state. Along with tripartite state actors a number of transnational public and private actors such as multinational corporations (global buyers and brand companies), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights organizations, consumers and citizens' groups are playing important roles for securing labor rights (Trubek, Mosher & Rothstein, 2000; Santoro, 2003; Donaghey et al, 2014).

Multinational Corporations: Many large brand companies or international suppliers have identified some key issues of labor rights, workplace safety and environmental protection. As such, the "code of conduct" combining core conventions of ILO and local labor laws, regulates labor practices of their overseas suppliers (Kaufman et al, 2004). This study investigated to what extent buyers' code of conduct is respected at the factory level and its consequence for improving labor standards.

The study reveals that leading multinational corporations such as Wal-Mart, Levi Strauss, Disney, Li & Fung, Sears, Hallmark, GAP, Hasbro and Tommy, Haines & Martinez, Tesco have offices, or full-time compliance officers, to investigate the evidence of code of conduct at their factories, or factories of their supplies. A marketing executive of Tesco reported: "We regularly inspect code of conduct at the factory. If the producers do not follow the codes of conduct, we refuse their products and do not make

any further contact with them". Similarly, a human resource management officer of a factory reported that the labor rights situation in the RMG industry is gradually improving and it is the inevitable outcome of the code of conduct imposed by multinational buyers. Union leaders have also acknowledged buyers' pressure as the best alternative to enforce labor standards at the factory.

Labor rights situation in the RMG industry is gradually improving and it is the inevitable outcome of the code of conduct imposed by multinational buyers.

In spite of the positive role of multinational corporations, this study has found some limitations. First, the frequency of unannounced inspections still remains very low. Employers are informed before buyers' visit well in advance and get prepared for these visits. Second, workers voices never reach the compliance monitoring officer. Employers' follow a strategy so that buyers cannot get in touch with the general workers. Third, workers and union leaders blame auditors for their unethical business. Workers reported that auditors accept undue privileges from factory owners as bribes and consequentially they do not give proper attention to the workers' rights. Fourth, compliance monitoring initiated by corporations is a paradox in ensuring labor rights. Inspections of code of conduct are very often done by staff members of the corporations. This self-audit system of corporations creates debate among the critics on whether it can be trusted and

transparent. Critics identify a number of conflicts of interest existing among the actors involved in this process (Esbenshade, 2004; Pruett, 2005; Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005). Management staffs reported that compliance monitoring serves the economic interest of the corporations rather than protecting labor rights. Finding any fault in the product may induce pressure on the producers to sell the product at half price of the contract, thus the corporations reap benefit.

NGOs, Human Rights Organizations & Citizens' Groups: In the demise of national system in the face of global economic and political forces, a new vision is developed to regulate labor rights at transnational arena which is defined as "transnational advocacy network" (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Turner, 1996; Frundt, 1996). It is evident that pressures from trade unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights organizations (HROs) and consumer groups have led multinational corporations (MNCs) to develop their own "codes of conduct" and a variety of mechanisms aimed at enforcing labor rights at their supplier plants (Locke et al., 2007; Schrage, 2004; Mamic, 2004).

The present study shows that many international and local level HROs are taking part in improving the labor rights situation in Bangladesh. A former woman worker who is currently working in an NGO, *Karmajibi Nari* (working women) reported : "There is no alternative way but organizing illiterate and unaware workers to execute labor rights at the

factory. Local level NGOs are trying to create awareness among the workers, employers, and civil society through individual contact, organizing worker conventions, seminars, and mass processions. We also arrange workshops for leadership development among the workers".

The activities of local NGOs and unions are dependent on the support of international NGOs and other human rights organizations who build networks to bring workers' rights issues to the international arena. The field evidence indicates that union leaders communicate with global brand companies if authorities do not give proper attention to protect labor rights. One union organizer said: "We try to negotiate with the employer to solve the crisis. Sometimes, employers' rigidity leads us to contact buyers because they do not want to sit together with us, they would rather rule with an iron hand to tackle workers unrest denying our demands. If all our efforts go in vain, we finally communicate with buyers, International NGOs and HROs".

Consumers' pressure has been considered as most significant for improving labor rights.

Consumers' pressure has been considered as most significant for improving labor rights by all of the research participants. Consumers' refusals to purchase products from the "bad companies" or demonstrations against the companies compel them to respect labor rights. The recent evidence has supported the interviewee's claim. For example, after

the factory building collapse in Dhaka, citizens and consumer groups demonstrations throughout the world demanding safe working conditions and compensations to the families of workers killed, lead many brand companies to sign agreements with local producers in Bangladesh for improving industrial safety and security (Norris, 2012). Consumers' protest holding the placard of 'No cloths with blood' motivated many people to refuse the product and thereby many corporations cancelled their orders in Bangladesh (Islam & Hossain, 2016: 167). Many research participants particularly union leaders placed much attention on this issue. A union leader reported that employers paid little attention to the protection of labor rights but workers could not protest it. Employers were unwilling to sit together with workers for negotiations. Workers could not force employers for collective negotiations due to their marginalized labor power. Living in a world of unequal power relations, workers had to pay the price unless consumers take the responsibility. If consumers rejected the products which were made in inhuman conditions, it would force the corporations to respect labor rights.

Labor scholars and human rights activists also hold a similar view. According to a labor scholar: "Consumers are more sensitive about workers' rights. They will avoid buying the products from bad companies. Even they will prefer to pay a higher amount for a product if it is made in standard work environment." At the same time, representatives of brand companies expressed their concerns mentioning that consumers need to be


strict in purchasing the products that are made complying with the code of conduct; otherwise good companies will suffer a competitive disadvantage because raising labor standards will increase the production cost. Santoro (2003:308) reported: "If consumers accord no marketplace value to the SA8000 mark, it will be a significant impediment to the global labor rights movement". However, much propagation about the violation of labor rights is a prerequisite for collective voice of the consumers because consumers living a corner of the globe are not able to see in what conditions the production is being made. The issue of labor rights violation needs to be broadcasted to raise awareness among the global consumers. Global alliances of workers unions and involvement of global human rights organization can discharge this role to organize global consumers. Thus, consumers' pressure, as well as local global networks of different organizations and stakeholders can transform an effective industrial relations system through which workers' rights can come into reality (fig.3).

Concluding Remarks

The aim of this paper was to explore the extent to which tripartite industrial relations are working in the current globalized economy, and what are the ways

Tripartite industrial relation systems are not too instrumental to bring changes in labor practices due to unequal power relations among the actors.

Fig. 3 Proposed Model of Future Workplace Relations



to ensure labor justice at global manufacturing industries. The findings of this study indicate that tripartite industrial relation systems are not too instrumental to bring changes in labor practices due to unequal power relations among the actors. In the absence of workers' union, the authoritarian role of the employers dismisses the collective negotiations at workplace. State's institutions are rarely found responsible to make a balance of power between the workers and employers being influenced by industrialists. In spite of the failure of traditional industrial relations system for capability enhancement of the workers, this study never suggests an alternative to tripartite collective bargaining, rather it reinforces on the strength of industrial relations. Enhancement of capability is dependent on benefit entitlements and means of actions are made available

through legislative provisions and collective labor agreements. In an unequal world where employers hold unbeaten power and state institutions are reluctant, external pressures are indispensable to make them responsible. Consumers and citizens' movements can exert extreme force on the global buyers and state respectively to maintain labor standards at workplace. Responsible role of the global actors can rebuild the sound industrial relations for protection of rights of all parties concerned. However, new global actors cannot bring any change in absence of employees, employers and the state. Thus, the paper concludes that new global actors are not considered as substitute, rather as complement of sound industrial relations. If all local global actors work together to end unjust labor conditions, a new regime of global labor governance will be created for ensuring

labor justice at global manufacturing industry.

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