



A Quest For Peace in West Asia: The UN and Israel-Lebanon Conflict 1982

Mohammad Naseem Khan*

Introduction

The Israel and Lebanon conflict, one of the dangerous and disastrous conflicts, greatly challenged peace and stability and tested the UN as international mechanism shouldering the responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security. The conflict started with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, and the subsequent occupation of some of the Lebanese territories in itself was a horrendous indictment in the region. The conflict departed radically from the Israeli invasion to full-fledged war with Arabs. There were two reasons that made the conflict distinct from the other Arab-Israeli conflicts. Firstly, it was fought at a time when chances of partial peace¹ were beginning to emerge in Arab-Israel relations thus, severely hampering the cordial relation process between the two enemies. Secondly, Israel's invasion of Lebanon was to gain political mileage rather than military goals. Thus the foremost purpose for Israel was to achieve political objectives of launching an assault against Lebanon.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 was an unequivocal challenge to international peace and security in the region. The invasion brought new dilemmas and concerns before UN as how to maintain regional peace and security and to ensure a withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. In this regard, the UN Security Council adopted numerous resolutions to end the conflict and bring about peace in the region.

* Lecturer. Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, India.

This paper attempts to underscore as to why the Israelis have decided to invade and capture some portion of the territories of Lebanon in the summer of 1982. The paper also seeks to analyse the role of UN in the conflict, which has greatly challenged and endangered the regional peace and security in West Asia. It also examines the performance of the UN, which has become an instrument achieving great powers' foreign policy objectives.

Israel's Early Interest in Lebanon

Background of the Israeli Invasion

The invasion reveals several underlying factors, which contributed to the outbreak of invasion. In this regard Israel's one of the most significant interests in Lebanon particularly its relationship with the Phalange Party, long pre-dates the presence of the PLO in Lebanon. Israel was interested in establishing a Maronite-dominated state in Lebanon by helping the Christian Phalangist Party, controlling the Litani River and annexing southern Lebanon. Ben Gurion and Moshe Dayan laid much emphasis on to support to Phalangists by all possible means for the creation of a Christian government in Lebanon, which may ally itself with Israel.² The Phalangists have always been sympathetic and loyal to Israel throughout and even before.

Destruction of the PLO and Control over the Lebanese Government

Lebanon has never posed a military threat to Israel, and Tel Aviv has never claimed any right to Lebanese territories. Relations between the two countries have been governed by an armistice agreement concluded in 1949. The emergence of the PLO in the 1960's and the expansions of its operations in late 1960s turned southern Lebanon into a confrontation zone between the Palestinians and Israelis.³ Israel first began to initiate military activity against Lebanon in 1968. Israeli policy at that time, was mainly expressed in the form of "reprisal raids" (e.g. aerial bombardment of Palestinian refugee camps and Lebanese towns and cities), was undertaken with two principal objectives in mind. Firstly, to punish the PLO for guerrilla activities against Israel as a deterrent to future guerrilla operations. Secondly, the objectives were to punish the Lebanese government that allowed the guerrillas to operate from its territory as a means of pressuring it to prevent future guerrilla activities.⁴ The raids served the purpose to damage Lebanon's governmental legitimacy, increased the

polarization of Lebanese politics, further compromised the armed forces and generally contributed to the breakdown of the Lebanese political systems which culminated in the civil war of 1975-76.⁵

When Lebanon was wrecked by civil strife during mid 1970's, Israel perceived the necessity of augmenting its policy of armed forces with other tactics, and thus devised a strategy for manipulation of political and military measures from within Lebanon. The fundamental objectives remained the same to deter Palestinian guerrilla activities and to pressurise the Lebanese government to prevent it. On the other hand, Israeli objectives with regard to Lebanon began to expand. Israel wanted to install a friendly government that would cooperate and support her policies extensively in all matters. For this purpose Israel developed and improved close and intimate relations with Bashir Gemayel, who commanded the largest Christian militia in Lebanon, the Kataeb military wing of the Phalange Party. In 1977 Gemayel began to receive direct military help from Israel, which reached \$ 100 billion by 1982. A large numbers of Phalang's men were given training in Israel and Tel Aviv provided Gemayel's party with sophisticated weapons as well as political and military advice.⁶ Moreover, Israel supported the renegade Major Saad Haddad with arms, money and advice, after installing him as commander of the area of the southern Lebanon that Israel captured in 1978 invasion. Through Haddad Israel consolidated its control over a significant portion of Lebanese territory and Haddad's militia gradually became fully integrated into the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF).

On September 17, 1978, Israel signed Camp David Accords with Egypt thereafter, its objectives with regard to Lebanon and PLO became more complicated and complex. During that period the PLO had developed a comprehensive civilian infrastructure in Lebanon including all the social institutions of a quasi state. Thus, Israel was no longer satisfied with just deterring guerrilla activity, but also became determined to completely crush and eliminate the PLO in all its manifestations. The Israeli government believed that if the PLO could be destroyed as an organisation, Palestinian nationalism could be broken and suppressed.

The Desire for Control over Litani River

The plans for the acquisition of the Litani River were articulated soon after Israel proclaimed as independent sovereign state in May 1948.

A prominent Zionist scholar wrote, “in order to have resources sufficient to allow it to perform its proper function in solving the Jewish problem, Palestine (e.g., the Jewish state) needed control over the Litani and Jordan waters as well as agricultural land east of the river.”⁷ And later, regarding what boundaries we have needed to create the Zionist enterprise viable, “it is required that Palestine include on the north the outlet of the Litani River.”⁸ The need for control of the Litani River has increased significantly between twenty-five (25%) and forty five (45%) percent in water availability, and as Israel’s water consumption continues to grow rapidly while existing resources are fully committed, the water requirements of the Litani river have come to constitute an almost non-negotiable issue.⁹

The dream of Moshe Dayan to annex the territory from the Litani southward could not be realised. To realise the full value of the Litani water, Israel must control an area of Lebanon (either by occupation or through arrangements with compliant government), far into the Beka valley and the Karaoun Dam.¹⁰ The Israelis, who had occupied south Lebanon since 1978, worked on the building a tunnel at the 90 degree bend of the Litani river which passes within only 25 miles of the Israel-Lebanon border to divert the Litani water into northern Israel.¹¹

Israeli Vision of Grand Strategy for West Asia

Another objective that was considered by Israeli decision-makers in planning for the June 1982 invasion involved the possibility of taking the first step in an expansive strategy of “balkanisation” of the region. In the weeks and months following the war, when it began to appear that the Lebanese government would not sign a peace treaty with Israel on its terms, and Israel’s agenda for a post war Lebanon might not be realised, Jerusalem pursued a policy of “divide and rule” that clearly reflected elements of the balkanisation concept.¹² Oded Yinon, an Israeli academician, described the concept as: ... Lebanon’s total dissolution into five provinces serves as a precedent for the entire Arab world, including Egypt, Syria and Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula and is already following that track. The dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically and religiously unique areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel’s primary target in the eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution of military power in those states serves as the primary short term target Syria will fall apart in accordance with its ethnic and structure into several states such as in present

day Lebanon, so that its coast will be a Shiite Alawi state, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, in Damascus another Sunni state hostile to its northern neighbour, and the Druzes who will get a state may be even in our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and in northern Jordan. This state will be the guarantee for peace and security in the area in the long run, and today that aim is already within our reach ... Iraq, rich on oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is a secure candidate for Israel's targets. Its dissolution is even more important to the higher aim of breaking Iraq up into denomination as in Syria and in Lebanon ... Jordan constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short run, but not in the long run, for it does not constitute a real threat in the long run after its dissolution, and in the termination of the lengthy rule of the then King Hussein and the transfer of power to the Palestinians in the short run.¹³

The excuse and pretext the Israelis used for starting the war was the assassination attempt on the Israeli Ambassador to Great Britain, Shloma Argov, on June 3, 1982. The PLO immediately disclaimed any responsibility for the attack on the ambassador. Nevertheless, the Argov incident was important because the then US secretary of state Alexander Haig had told the Israelis that they would need a reason to undertake their military plans in order to get the US support,¹⁴ and in the absence of a PLO violation of the cease-fire, this event was seized upon to provide legitimacy to the Israeli invasion

The entire plan of invasion was thus based on the use of superior military force in order to change the entire politico-strategic balance between Israel, the PLO, Lebanon and Syria in Israel's favour. The assumption was that the PLO was the central point of the Palestinian problem and the weakest link in the constellation of Arab forces facing Israel. Ariel Sharon believed that breaking this link would deal a body blow to the Palestinian movement, restore Lebanese independence, and leave Syria a weak and isolated confrontation state.

The Course of the War

On June 4, 1982, the Israeli air force struck at positions in southern Lebanon and west Beirut in alleged retaliation for attempted assassination of Israeli ambassador Mr. Shloma Argov on London on June 3, 1982. On the following day Israeli jets and gunboats bombarded the Palestinian's position along the highway between Beirut and south Lebanon. For the

first time since July 1981, artillery battle began between PLO and Israeli force at the border. On next day Israel launched a massive invasion of southern Lebanon.¹⁵ On June 6, 1982, before full-fledged invasion the Israeli chief of staff informed the commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon that Israel intended to launch a military operation in order that "Israel would no longer be within PLO artillery range".¹⁶

On same day, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon with full strength. The stated objective of Operation Peace in Galilee was to crush the PLO as a Lebanon based military threat. The long range goal was soon transpired to be the creation of a PLO free 40 kilometre "buffer zone" in southern Lebanon and the signing of a peace treaty with and Israeli-influenced Lebanese government.¹⁷ From June 6 to June 13, 1982 Israeli armed forces moved towards northward preventing the PLO advance on the outskirts of west Beirut and captured the Palestinian stronghold at Beaufort Castle and Nabatiyeh, took control of port cities of Tyre, Sidon and Damour and bombed several PLO targets in and around west Beirut.¹⁸ Palestinians responded to the invasion with a heavy and fierce resistance. The PLO anti-aircraft's batteries shot down sky hawk jet near Nabatiyeh and Serafaud. Syrian artillery also opened fire on Israeli forces following shelling of Syrian positions.¹⁹ Israeli forces then started to exert pressure on southern flank of the Syrian forces in Beka valley in eastern Lebanon. At the same time over 90 Israeli jets attacked and destroyed the Syrian SAM (surface-to-air-missile) system in Beka valley and 16-22 Syrian MIG fighters planes were reportedly shot down. Syria also did the same to shoot down 19 Israeli jets.²⁰

On June 10, 1982 Israeli authorities ordered UNIFIL to stop delivering food to Lebanese civilian caught in the fighting. Israeli jets attacked Beirut international airport and refugee camps, and Israel demanded the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Beirut in order to avert an IDF attack on the city itself. An US administrative official revealed that Reagan had sent a firm message to Begin demanding to halt to the invasion and necessary preparations for its withdrawal.²¹ On June 14, 1982 Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) encircled the western half of Beirut trapping approximately 7,000 PLO guerrillas and 2,000 Syrian troops. On June 16, 1982 Israel fortified its position around Beirut capturing Lebanese University. On the same day Israel assured to United States that IDF would not enter Beirut, in a meeting between Begin and Reagan. Both Reagan and Begin agreed after

talks on June 21, 1982 that all foreign forces had to be withdrawn from Lebanon, and the US subsequently urged Arab and European governments to exert pressure upon the PLO for evacuating Beirut. By 25, 1982 June after continued skirmishes with Syrian troops, Israel had established control of the Beirut-Damascus high way.

On June 30, 1982 Reagan denied giving Israel “green light”, for invasion of west Beirut but he approved of Israeli demand that all PLO forces must leave Lebanon.²² By first week of July, the city of Beirut was indeed and truly under Israeli siege. Israel even cut off food, water and electricity supply to west Beirut during July 4-7, 1982.²³ Throughout July and first half of August Israeli forces advanced their forward position step by step systematically tightened their grip on the city while frequent and heavy bombing was directed primarily against the main PLO stronghold at Fakhani, the Palestinian refugees camps, the southern suburb and, later on, the commercial area of Hamra. In addition, Israel periodically cut off supplies of food, water and electricity in an effort to heighten tension between the local population and the fighters. The PLO with its tanks, heavy artillery, mobile rocket launchers and other heavy equipment, managed to attack Israeli positions throughout most of the siege, but as time wore on and its ammunition became more sporadic and less effective.²⁴

At the same time Syrian and Israeli tanks and infantry fought in the hills east of the Beirut for control of the strategically important Beirut-Damascus highway. Eventually, Israeli forces pushed the Syrian forces back towards the Beka valley and consolidate their control of road, thereby preventing any possibility of Syrian reinforcements approaching west Beirut.²⁵ In mid August a few days after Israel had seized a PLO stronghold inside the Qusai area of west Beirut and launched the fiercest shelling of the war, all parties finally agreed a withdrawal plan. Elements of multinational forces composed of US, French and Italian troops began arriving on 21 August 1982 to oversee the evacuation, and by 30 August 1982 the PLO forces had relinquished their heavy armaments and left for Tunisia, South and North Yemen (at that time both south and North Yemen were not united) Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan and Algeria.²⁶

On the 14 September 1982, a large bomb exploded in the east Beirut headquarters’ of the Phalange party, killing the president, elect of Lebanon, Bashir Gamayel, during a meeting. The Israeli minister of defence

General Sharon contacted Prime Minister Menachem Begin after hearing Gamayel's death and they determined that Israel should immediately occupy west Beirut. The reason for this Israeli advance, in violation of the Habib agreement, was to maintain law and order.²⁷ On 17 September 1982, by invading west Beirut, Israel broke the obligations arising from its status as a signatory of the cease-fire and the Habib agreement.

The most heinous and terrible event took place at Sabra and Chatila involving the loss of the lives of hundreds of men, women and children which raised very important issues concerning the legal responsibility of the political and military leaders of Israel. The Phalangist militia men backed by Israeli government entered the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila and massacred their inhabitants. The massacre activity continued all day and all night until Saturday morning. 300 civilians have been killed in the camps in the massacres at Sabra and Chatila.²⁸ Until September 26, 1982, most of Lebanese territories were occupied by two foreign armies (Israel and Syria). After the Sabra and Chatila massacre the Israeli armed forces withdrew from Beirut. The north of Lebanon was dominated by Syrian army that refused to withdraw from the country until the Israel did it. On September 23, 1982 the first units of Multinational forces (MNF) arrived in west Beirut. The Israel army pulled out of west Beirut by September 26, 1982.

At the conclusion of the more than three months of combat there were approximately 20,000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians died, 2,000 Palestinian and Lebanese fighters killed, 40,000 wounded civilians and 300,000 homeless refugees. There were 434 Israelis killed. A major part of west Beirut was physically destroyed as it was considered to be significant portion of southern Lebanon.²⁹ The consequences for the Palestinian of the Israeli invasion have likewise been devastating and damaging. In the aftermath of the horrors of the invasion itself, the Palestinian population in Lebanon experienced the most heinous genocide of Sabra and Chatila followed by two years of systematic repression, torture and murder at the hands of hostile Lebanese who want to drive them from Lebanon.

The Role of United Nations

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, on June 1982, was intimately linked to the question of a collapse of international peace and security in

the region. The United Nations was the main international organisation which reacted sharply and immediately to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In this regard UN has exercised every means and methods to end the conflict, which has posed serious threat to regional peace and stability. The UN Security Council adopted several resolutions to end the war and bring about peace in the region.

The day after the Israeli assault began on June 6, 1982, Security Council met at the request of Lebanese government to discuss the situation. A presidential statement was issued calling on the parties to adhere strictly to the cease-fire (July 23, 1981) and to refrain from any hostile act that could aggravate the situation.³⁰ On June 5, 1982 the Security Council of United Nations discussed the matter and adopted resolution 508(1982), which attempted to dissuade the Israel from invading Lebanon. The resolution 508(1982) in which Council called upon all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border on June 6, 1982.³¹ The Security Council further requested “ all the member states which are in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear upon those concerned so that the cessation of hostilities declared by UN Security Council resolution 490 (1981) can be respected.³² Under the Resolution 490, the Security Council on July 21, 1981 unanimously called for an immediate cessation of all armed attacks in Lebanon and reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon within its international recognised boundaries.

While Israel ignored the resolution 508(1981) and proposed cease fire, the Secretary General informed to the UN Security Council on June 6 that PLO declared its acceptance of resolution 508 (1982) and reaffirmed its commitment to stop all military activities across the Lebanese border.³³ The Secretary General also advised the Security Council that even after the time for cease fire had expired and despite continuing massive Israeli air attacks PLO Chairman Yarer Arafat had given order to all PLO units to withhold fire for a further specified period.³⁴ But Israel’s response was to continue its heavy bombing attacks on Lebanon which according to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) included approximately 110 bombing during the first eight hours of the proposed June 6 cease fire. Shortly thereafter Israel invaded Lebanon by land, sea and air with massive force.

The Security Council on June 6, 1982 adopted another resolution 509 (1982) in which it demanded that Israel withdraw its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon and that all parties observe the terms of the resolution 508 (1982).³⁵ This resolution was much sharper in which Security Council had taken a little tough measure against Israel than the earlier resolution 508 (1982). The Security Council called upon all parties to communicate to the Secretary General of their acceptance of the terms of the resolution within 24 hours. Under the provision of the resolution 509 (1982), the Secretary General was asked to undertake “all possible efforts to ensure the implementation of and compliance with this resolution and to report to the Security Council as early as possible and not later than forty eight hours after the adoption of this resolution”.³⁶ The Secretary General submitted his report on 7 June on the implementation of resolution 509 (1982), the Secretary General informed the Security Council that he had received replies from Lebanon and the PLO had agreed to the implementation of the Council resolution but the Israeli reply set out several condition that were tantamount to a rejection. The reply from the permanent representative of Lebanon said that while his government would have preferred a resolution clearly based on the Armistice Agreement, calling on Israel to abide by it.³⁷ Lebanese government regretted the Security Council had not provided in resolution 509 (1982) “for stronger means of implementation.”³⁸ The reply from the PLO to the Secretary General in which Yarer Arafat said, “PLO had decided to agree to the content of your message relevant to Security Council resolution 509 (1982)”.³⁹

The Secretary General received a reply from Israeli government which set out certain conditions in its letter. These conditions are given below:⁴⁰

- (1) The “Peace for Galilee” operation was ordered because of the intolerable situation created by presence in Lebanon of a large number of terrorist operating from that country, equipped with modern, long range weaponry, threatening the lives of the civilian population of Galilee.
- (2) The withdrawal of Israeli military forces prior to the conclusion of concrete arrangements that would permanently and reliably preclude hostile action against Israel’s citizen is inconceivable.

- (3) The inherent right of self-defence was one of the fundamental rights of sovereign states. Articles 51 of the UN Charter reaffirm the right of self-defence of all member states.

These above mentioned two resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) therefore became important political symbols in the negotiations and consultations on the conditions and modalities of the Israeli withdrawal. For Lebanon, the unanimous demand by the Security Council for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal by the Israeli troops from Lebanon was even stronger than resolutions 425 and 426 (1978). Syria and former Soviet Union strongly gave support to Lebanon, and stressed on to the implementation of these two resolutions as necessary conditions for any political settlement of the Israeli-Lebanese conflict.⁴¹

On the other hand Israel made it clear that it did not recognize or accept resolution 508 or 509 (1982). Therefore, the Security Council, on June 8, 1982, received a draft resolution that would have condemned Israel for not complying with the two previous Council resolutions calling for an immediate cessation of military activities in Lebanon and demanding unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from that country.⁴² The draft resolution was not adopted due to use of veto by United States.

The official explanation given in the Security Council by the U.S. permanent representative, Ambassador Jeane Kirk Patrick for the US veto in the following words, “Unfortunately, the resolution now before us is not sufficiently balanced to accomplish the objective of ending the cycle of violence and establishing the conditions for a just and lasting peace in Lebanon. For that reason the United States voted against this resolution.”⁴³ The Soviet Union and PLO said the Israeli aggression was undertaken with the support of the United States whose disgraceful vote had frustrated the Security Council’s action. Under other provision of the text the UN Council would have demanded, “that within six hours all hostilities must be stopped in compliance with Security Council resolution 508 (1982) and 509 (1982). It would also have decided in the event of non-compliance to meet again to consider practical ways and means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”⁴⁴

Two weeks after the Israel invasion, the mandate of the United Nations peacekeeping force in the area, UNIFIL⁴⁵ came up for extension. The Secretary General reported to the Security Council on June 18, 1982

that the government of Lebanon wanted the Force to continue to be stationed in the area. Taking the note of Secretary General's report, on June 18, 1982, the Security Council adopted the resolution 511 (1982), in which Council "renewed the mandate of the UNIFIL for another "interim" period of two months.⁴⁶ Under the other provisions of the resolution, the Council authorised the Force to extend its protection and humanitarian assistance to the population of the area.⁴⁷ The United States believed that the extension would contribute to the resolution of peace and the authority of the Lebanese government. On the other hand former Soviet Union's view was that the extension should only be seen as an interim arrangement and that much larger decision must be faced. The Soviet Union, UK, China and Poland expressed the view that the Palestinian question still remained at the heart of the matter and there could be no lasting peace until the issue of Palestinian self-determination was resolved. During the whole of the siege, Israeli forces seriously hindered the free movement of people and goods between West Beirut and the outside world. The extent of the blockade and the seriousness of its consequences gave rise to numerous protests from the humanitarian organizations, paving the way for the UN Security Council to adopt three resolutions: on June 19, 1982, (Resolution 512, (1982), July 4, 1982, (Resolution 513, (1982), and July 29, 1982 (Resolution 515).

The UN Security Council, on June 19, 1982, passed the resolution 512 (1982), in which it called on all parties to the conflict in Lebanon "respect the right of the civilian population, to refrain from all acts of violence against populations and to take all appropriate measures to alleviate the sufferings caused by the conflicts." The resolution also called on "the parties to facilitate the dispatch and distribution of aid provided by agencies of the United Nations and by non-governmental organisations particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross."⁴⁸

Under the provisions of the draft, the Security Council appealed to member-states to continue to provide the most extensive humanitarian aid possible. It stressed the particular humanitarian responsibilities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) towards the civilian population and called on all the parties to the conflict not to hamper the exercise of those responsibilities and to assist in humanitarian efforts in Israeli occupied areas. The Security Council also asked Secretary General to make every effort to ensure the

implementation of and compliance with this resolution and to report on these efforts to the Council as soon as possible.⁴⁹

The draft of the resolution 512 (1982) was submitted by France. France and Japan regretted the great number of civilian casualties and heavy destruction of property and asked that the urgent action be required to provide aid to the affected families. The United States said its principal concern was the restoration in full of Lebanon's sovereignty. The USSR regretted the United States was not guided by humanitarian concerns but instead had objected to such concern in the resolution and had voted for it to avoid isolation. On the other hand Israel expressed its view that the UN Security Council should refrain from attempts to abuse humanitarian concerns for political objective and that it treated the suffering of Israel's civilian population with callousness.⁵⁰ On June 26, 1982, the draft resolution have required all parties in Lebanon to observe an immediate cessation of hostilities was vetoed by United States in the Security Council. The proposed text also had demanded an immediate withdrawal of IDF engaged in fighting around Beirut to a distance of 10 kilometres from the periphery of that city as a first step towards the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the simultaneous withdrawal of the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut, which shall retire to the existing camps.⁵¹ Under another provision of the draft resolution the Security Council as an immediate measure requested UN Secretary General to station UN military observers by agreement with the Lebanese government, with instruction to supervise the cease-fire and disengagement in and around Beirut.⁵² All the UN Security Council members except United States voted in favour of the draft resolution. The United States vetoed the resolution and said that the resolution failed to all call for essential recognition of the authority of the government of Lebanon and the elimination of Palestinian elements from Beirut and else where.

When the US vetoed the Security Council draft on June 26, 1982 the General Assembly immediately supported the demands of the Security Council that "Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon and that all parties to the conflicts cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities in Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border."⁵³ The Assembly also condemned Israel for its non-compliance with the Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and urged the

Council” in the event of continued failure by Israel to comply with its demands to consider practical ways and means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.⁵⁴

The UN Security Council met on July 4, 1982 at the request of the permanent representative of Jordan Hazem Nuseibeh, who asked for an immediate meeting to examine the extremely grave situation resulted from Israeli invasion against Lebanese and Palestinian civilian population in Israeli occupied Lebanon. The Council, therefore, unanimously adopted resolution 513 (1982). The resolution called to repudiate all acts of violence against civilian in Lebanon and respect towards civil rights without discrimination.⁵⁵ In its resolution, the Council further called for the restoration of the normal supply of essential and vital facilities such as water, electricity, food products and medical services, particularly in Beirut.

The Security Council on July 29, 1982, at the request of Egypt and France, arranged a meeting to consider the draft presented by both countries. The draft resolution demanded an immediate and lasting cease-fire throughout Lebanon and simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli and Palestinian forces from the west Beirut and reaffirmed the right of all states in the region to existence and security as well as the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people including the rights of self-determination with all its implications.⁵⁶ The draft resolution could not adopted as Egypt and France proposed it. Another draft resolution, submitted by Spain, was adopted the resolution 515 (1982) by Security Council. The resolution has two operatives’ paragraphs. The first paragraph demanded that Israel lift immediately the blockade of all Beirut in order to permit the dispatch of supplies to attend the urgent necessities of the civilian population and allow the distribution of aid provided by non-governmental organisation, in particular, the International Committee of the Red Cross.⁵⁷ The second paragraph requested the Secretary General to transmit the text of the resolution to the government of Israel and keep the Security Council informed on its implementation.⁵⁸ The resolution was adopted with 14 countries in favour and the United States did not participate. It was first time in the history that United States did not participate in the Security Council vote.

On August 1, 1982, at the request of Lebanon, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted another resolution 516 (1982). In its

resolution, Council called for immediate cease-fire and authorised the Secretary General to deploy immediately, at the request of the Lebanese government, the UN observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut.⁵⁹ The Secretary General was asked to report back within four hours on the implementation of the resolution. The Secretary General was unable to report back on the implementation of the resolution within four hours as directed because Israel refused to consider the matter of UN observers until a cabinet meeting on 5 August 1982. Israel rejected the new observation operation and no additional observers could be sent to Beirut. On the otherhand the Lebanese authorities as well as the PLO promised to cooperate fully with the observers.⁶⁰

On August 3, 1982 the Security Council met again as Israeli forces crossed the “green line” separating east Beirut from western sector of the city. The statement of Security Council called for implementation of resolution 516 (1982). Therefore on August 4, 1982 Security Council adopted a resolution 517 which called for “the prompt return of Israeli troops to August 1, 1982 positions. The Secretary General was asked to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution later than 5, August 1982.⁶¹ Soviet Union alleged Israel for violating the cease-fire and being used to impose American policy in the West Asia. The United States abstained herself because the resolution did not explicitly and unequivocally calls for the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon.⁶² On August 5, 1982 the Secretary General reported to Security Council of Israel’s non-compliance with both resolutions 516 (1982) and 517 (1982). The very next day on 6 August 1982 the UN Security Council failed to adopt the Soviet sponsored resolution, which proposed to prohibit the United Nations member-states from supplying weapons and military aid to Israel until the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory.⁶³ The resolution was not adopted due to negative vote of United States. Voting against the resolution, United States said it would not support any action that could adversely affect the outcome of the Habib mission. The draft called for sanction against Israel, as it was unbalanced and would not contribute to attain peaceful settlement between the two parties.

The UN Security Council on August 12, 1982, unanimously adopted the resolution 518. In its resolution Council expressed its most serious concern about Israel’s continued activities in Lebanon. The Council demanded that “ Israel and all parties to the conflict to observe strictly the

terms of Security Council resolutions relevant to the immediate cessation of military activities within Lebanon and particularly in and around Beirut. All restrictions on the entry of supplies to the city of Beirut were to be lifted and Israel was told to cooperate fully in securing effective deployment of UN observer.⁶⁴ Ten observers were already in Beirut, with another 80 ready to take up positions as soon as Israel would permit them. On August 17, 1982, the UN Security Council decided to extend for a further interim period of two months, until October 19, 1982- the present mandate of UNIFIL, which was due expire at midnight 19 August 1982.⁶⁵ The Council took this decision with the adoption of resolution 519 (1982).

As on September 16, 1982, the Israeli forces completed their occupation of west Beirut, the United States described Israel's actions a clear violation of the cease-fire accord and expressed full support for Lebanese government's call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The next day the UN Security Council met and unanimously adopted resolution 520 (1982). The Council condemned the "recent Israeli incursion into Beirut in violation of cease-fire agreements and demanded an immediate return to position occupied by Israel before September 15, and asked as a first step toward the full implementation of Security Council resolutions. It further asked Secretary General to report on the situation within 24 hours.⁶⁶ This was only time the United States voted in favour of resolution that explicitly condemned Israel for their policies in Lebanon.

On September 18, 1982, the massacre of Palestinian refugees took place in Sabra and Chatila refugee camps, the US President Reagan expressed "outrage and revulsion" over Israeli action and demanded an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces.⁶⁷ On the following day September 19, 1982, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 521 in which Council condemned the "criminal massacre of Palestinians in Beirut (Sabra and Chatila) and authorized Secretary General to increase immediately the number of UN observers in and around Beirut from 10 to 50. The Council urged the Secretary General to consult with the Lebanese government for rapid deployment of the 50 UN observers and insisted that all concerned must allow the UN observers and forces established by the Security Council in Lebanon to be deployed and to discharge their mandate.⁶⁸ The Secretary General was asked to report to the Council

within 48 hours. The Israeli government agreed to allow UN observers into Beirut as well to accelerate the withdrawal of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) from west Beirut. The UN General Assembly, on September 24, 1982, also condemned the massacres of Palestinian refugees in Sabra and Chatila and decided to support fully the provisions of Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) in which Council has demanded Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and across Lebanese-Israeli border.⁶⁹

The Secretary General reported to Security Council that the Lebanese government requested the return of the Multinational force (MNF). On September 19, Italy urged France and the US to re-deploy the MNF in Beirut for protection of civilians. The response was positive and the Lebanese government formally requested the return of the MNF to Beirut. The Security Council, on 18 October 1982, decided again to extend the present mandate of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further period of three months until January 9, 1983. The present two months mandate was due to expire at midnight 19 October 1982. The Council also insisted that there shall be no interference under any pretext with the operation of UNIFIL and that the force shall have full freedom of movement in the discharge of its mandate.⁷⁰

On November 29, 1982, the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)⁷¹ was set up to separate Israeli and Syrian forces, was extended by UN Security Council for the 17th time. It was authorised to remain in place for a further period of six months until May 31, 1983.⁷² Its mandate had to expire on November 30, 1982. The Council took its action with the unanimous adoption of resolution 524. In the text, the Council called on the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973) and requested the Secretary General to submit at the end of the new period a report on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement that resolution.⁷³ The Security Council had called to cease all hostilities and to start the implementation of Council resolution 242 (1967)⁷⁵ in all its part, which sets forth principles for a peaceful settlement in West Asia.

On September 9, 1983, Lebanon submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council that contained some proposal for UN peacekeeping force or observers in Lebanon. The proposal explicitly asked

for UN assistance on internal matter such as maintenance of public order. The draft resolution also called for an immediate cease-fire and a prompt cessation of all hostilities throughout Lebanon. However the draft was never put to a vote in the Council. Soviet Union, consulting with the permanent member of the Council made it clear that it would not accept the proposal to establish a UN presence in the area under the existing circumstances because the conflicts at this stage was internal and not international.⁷⁵ In November 1983, a faction of the PLO opposed to Chairman Arafat started an armed rebellion against the pro Arafat force in the Tripoli area. The development in Tripoli was discussed in a meeting of the Security Council on 11 November 1983. The statement was issued, appealing to all parties concerned to exercise the almost restraint and seek freely to attain and to respect, and immediate cessation of hostilities.⁷⁶

The Security Council, at the request of France, met again on November 23, 1983 and unanimously adopted resolution 542 (1983). The resolution repeated the call for a cease-fire. The resolution also requested the Secretary General to follow the situation in northern Lebanon, to consult the Lebanese government, and report back to the Council.⁷⁷ On December 3, 1983, the Secretary General informed Council members that he had decided to authorize the flying of UN flag along side the national flag, on the ship which could evacuate the armed elements of the PLO from Tripoli (Lebanon). None did not support the idea of Yaser Arafat sailing away to safety under the UN flag and the Israelis were strongly opposed to the decision. Moreover, France, on February 14, 1984, asked for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to consider the situation in the Beirut area. France had consistently stated both in connection with the constitution of the Multinational force and on later occasions that they would have preferred a UN to a non-UN force in Beirut. To this end France, therefore, submitted a draft resolution in the Security Council on February 23, 1984. After several consultations and meeting the final version of the French resolution was put to vote in Security Council on February 29, 1984. The resolution was not adopted due to veto power used by Soviet Union. Vetoing the resolution, Soviet representative expressed that the French draft contained “unacceptable or ambiguous wording relating to the mandate of the United Nations forces in Beirut. He also said that during the course of the work of the draft resolution it became quite clear that some members of the Security Council did not wish to assume the

responsibility to resume interference in Lebanon.”⁷⁸

Moreover, while renewing UNIFIL’s mandate in October 1984, the Security Council asked the Secretary General to continue consultation with the government of Lebanon and other parties those who are involved in the conflict. He approached the governments of Israel and Lebanon, suggesting for negotiations as soon as possible on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory and related security arrangements in southern Lebanon. On February 25, 1985, Lebanon requested the Security Council to consider the continuing acts of aggression and abusive practices of Israeli occupying forces in southern Lebanon, the western Beka and the Rashaya district. Therefore, Lebanon submitted a draft resolution for vote in Security Council. The draft resolution demanded that Israel withdraw its troops forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundary of Lebanon, affirm that the forth Geneva Convention of 1949 (on the protection of civilian persons in time of war) applied to the territories occupied by Israel. It also demanded that Israel desist from its practices against the civilian population in the occupied territories and immediately lift all restrictions and obstacles to the restoration of normal conditions.⁷⁹ The draft resolution, however, was not adopted due to veto of United States.

After the extension of the UNIFIL mandate until October 11, 1985 by Security Council, the Secretary General initiated new efforts to restore peace in the region. The objective was to persuade the Israeli government to abandon its plan to establish a “security zone” inside Lebanon after the withdrawal of Israeli forces and to workout with the Lebanese government security arrangements based on the deployment of UNIFIL along the border as well as measures that would ensure the security of local population on both sides of the border. While the efforts of Secretary General was in progress, the situation in Lebanon deteriorated further both in Beirut and in the south Lebanon. In May 1985 heavy fighting broke out in and around the Sabra, Chatila and Bourj-e- Barajneh camps in east Beirut. On May 22, 1985, Secretary General appealed to the Lebanese government and to all parties concerned to put an end to violence involving civilian population.

On May 30, 1985, Egypt requested a meeting of the UN Security Council on the continued escalation of violence involving the civilian

population in and around Beirut affecting the safety and security of the Palestinian in the refugee camps. Next day on May 31, 1985 Security Council unanimously adopted another resolution 564, which expressed “deep concern” at the heavy cost-of human lives and called on all concerned to end acts of violence against the civilian population in Lebanon and in particular in and around Palestinian refugees camps. The resolution further called on all parties to allow international relief efforts, especially by the UNRWA and ICRC to provide humanitarian assistance to all those affected by fighting.⁸⁰ The resolution 564 did not call for any UN role in the task of protecting the Palestinian refugee camps. The fighting continued during 1985-1988 in an around east Beirut till 1988. On June 6, 1986, regretting the continued fighting, UN Secretary General appealed to all concerned to use their influence to bring about the cessation of the fighting. A total blockade against the camps was imposed in October 1986 and heavy fighting continued until the autumn of 1987 known as “the camps war”. In view of the above incidents an accord to end the Kamal siege of the camps was concluded in September 1987, but the siege was not totally lifted until January 1988. Nevertheless, by 1988, Lebanon was besieged by political anarchy, local militia leader in conflicts or competition with each other, and an international civil war. Thus, Israeli June 1982 invasion of Lebanon was anchored in delusion propelled by deceit and was bound to end in calamity. It was a war for which Israel gained little and paid enormous price.

Conclusion

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 is characterised a wasteful military and political adventure. It is clear that Israel was unsuccessful in realisation of its major objectives in Lebanon. In addition, the country has suffered a number of negative unanticipated consequences in terms of cost and deaths from its invasion and occupation of Lebanon. On the other hand the negative consequences for Lebanon were the destruction of the country, Capital City, and maiming of its citizen, the humiliation of foreign occupation and renewed plunge into civil war.

The Israeli-Lebanon conflict of 1982 has presented one of the gravest and most complex challenges to international order in the 1980's. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon has been marked by almost uninterrupted series of violation both the law deriving from Hague Conventions (which

governs methods of fighting) and that of deriving from Geneva Convention and relating to the situation of persons in enemy hands. The operation Peace for Galilee therefore was obviously the most blatant breach of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

Israel has been guilty of aggression against the sovereignty of Lebanon and the rights of the Palestinians. The invasion has been contrary to the provision of the UN Charter and fundamental principles of international law. Israel was also in breach of international obligation to safeguard the right of self-determination of Palestinian people. It is realised that until the Israel recognises the rights of Palestinian, there can be no lasting peace in West Asia or an end of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, Israel violated international rules dealing with prisoners, both civilian and fighters, particularly by denying Palestinian and Lebanese fighter prisoners as provided under Geneva Convention of 1949 and Additional Protocol of 1977.

The invasion of Lebanon by Israel in June 1982 was one of the most serious breaches of the international legal order. It has been witnessed by violence, death and destruction of enormous proportion and the gruesome massacres of Palestinian refugees in Sabra and Chatila. The invasion has no validity in international laws as Israel did not have any grounds to rely on the provision of the Charter of the United Nations concerning self-defence. Thus the objective of the war, therefore, was to achieve certain political and strategic aims at a high cost.

Israel has constantly and deliberately violated the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and often refused to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter. According to the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council determines that there is a threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. Such a determination by Security Council has not been made because of the use or threat of the use of veto by the United States. However, Israel has been obliged to carry out the decision of the Security Council that fall within the competence of the appropriate organ of the United Nations. Israel, in addition, has categorically refused to settle its disputes peacefully, contrary to the international obligation undertaken under Articles 2(3) of the UN Charter. The UN Security Council adopted several resolutions and attempted to repress Israeli aggression. Israel did not

comply with most of the resolutions. Most of the resolutions passed by the Security Council have enjoyed only temporary respects sometimes none at all from the parties concerned particularly by Israel.

The United Nations has not been able to impose sanctions against Israel for the latter's aggression against Lebanon because United States has often used its right to veto in the UN Security Council and blackmailed the General Assembly into abstaining from voting for such sanctions. The US has demonstrated its connivance in the Israeli vicious designs by directly supporting the aggression in the Security Council. It has also vetoed the resolutions calling for withdrawal of the Israeli forces and by refusing to vote the General Assembly resolution, which denounced the Israeli aggression. Thus it may be summarised that the Israeli-Lebanon conflict 1982 displayed the weakness and inefficiency of the UN. The United Nations peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts were inadequate and insufficient. The UN inability and ineffectiveness were revealed before the international community during the conflict between Israel and Lebanon, as a guarantor and custodian of international peace and security.

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